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“For let it be agreed that a government is republican in proportion as 
every member composing it has his equal voice in the direction of its 
concerns . . . .” 
–Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In August 2011, Congress passed a strange piece of legislation 
intended to bind itself into the future.  In spite of persistently high 
unemployment and an unremarkable deficit-to-GDP ratio,1 and in 
spite of public polling that consistently showed that creating jobs was 
the American public’s top priority,2 politicians inside the infamous 
Washington “Beltway” had spent months locked in a debate over ways 
to cut deficits and balance the federal budget—policies that would 
not create jobs and by some estimates would put millions out of 
work.3  This debate came to a head as Republicans refused to raise 
the nation’s debt ceiling without substantial budget cuts.  Unable to 
come to terms, our “leaders” in Washington punted. 
The Budget Control Act of 20114 raised the debt ceiling and 
enacted $917 billion in budget cuts over ten years without raising any 
new revenue.5  Further, the law created a special bipartisan “Super 
 
           * The author is Counsel with Demos.  Portions of this text have been previously 
published in a variety of reports or articles by the author.  The author would like to 
thank several Demos colleagues for their roles in developing the ideas contained in 
this article: David Callahan, J. Mijin Cha, Lisa Danetz, Anthony Kammer, Liz 
Kennedy, and Brenda Wright; several others who have inspired me throughout my 
career working on campaign finance issues: Blair Bowie, Derek Cressman, Owen Fiss, 
and Robert Post; and, finally, the colleagues who generously reviewed drafts of this 
article: Mark Alexander, Lee Drutman, Johanna Kalb, Carlin Meyer, John Paul 
Rollert, and Kate Shaw. 
 1  See U.S. Dept. of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the 
Current Population Survey, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 (last visited 
May 14, 2013); Paul Krugman, The Mostly Solved Deficit Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 
2013, 3:17 PM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/10 
/the-mostly-solved-deficit-problem/. 
 2  Frank Newport, Americans Give Guns, Immigration Reform Low Priority Creating 
Jobs and Growing the Economy Get Highest Priority, GALLUP POLITICS May 7, 2013, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/162347/ 
americans-give-guns-immigration-reform-low-priority.aspx. 
 3  Adam Hersh & Sarah Ayers, Disinvesting America, Apr. 14, 2011, 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/budget/news/2011/04/14/9485/disinvest
ing-in-america/. 
 4  Budget Control Act of 2011 (“BCA”), Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240. 
 5  See Alec Hamilton and Richard Yeh, Explainer: The Debt Deal—What Happens 
Next and What’s on the Chopping Block?, WNYC Aug. 3, 2011, http://www.wnyc.org 
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Committee” to further reduce the deficit, and specified that if the two 
major parties could not agree on $1.2 trillion worth of additional cuts 
by January 2, 2013, a series of automatic cuts were to take place—
known as the “sequester.”6  The sequester cuts were formulaic, largely 
applying across the board. 
The idea was that these cuts would be so odious to both sides—
draconian cuts to social services to offend Democrats, deep cuts to 
the military to anger Republicans—that it would force them to the 
table to craft a more reasonable deal.  Of course, there was no deal 
and the cuts ensued.  In early 2013, these cuts began to have a real 
impact on Americans’ lives.  The White House predicted that 70,000 
students would lose access to Head Start benefits.7  Cancer patients 
on Medicare started being turned away from oncology clinics.8  
Unemployment benefits were cut by more than 10 percent for two 
million Americans.9  Local housing authorities stopped issuing rental 
vouchers for the homeless, and even rescinded previously issued 
vouchers.10  And Air Force bases cut down on training flights for 
pilots.11 
Then, in April 2013, the $637 million in Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) budget cuts under the sequester forced the 
agency to furlough or reduce hours for 50,000 employees, including 
15,000 air traffic controllers.12  In the following days, flights were 
 
/articles/its-free-country/2011/aug/03/debt-deal-so-far/.  
 6  Bipartisan Policy Center, The Sequester Explained (Nov. 2011), 
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files 
/BCA%20Sequester%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf. 
 7  Fact Sheet: Examples of How the Sequester Would Impact Middle Class Families, Jobs 
and Economic Security, THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y,  (2013), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/08/fact-sheet-examples-
how-sequester-would-impact-middle-class-families-job. 
 8  See Sequester Cuts Hitting Cancer Patients (NBC television broadcast Apr. 27, 
2013), available at http://www.nbcnews.com/video/nightly-news
/51689112 /#51689112.  
 9  Lisa Rein, Sequester Means 11 Percent Cut In Unemployment Benefits, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 8, 2013, 3:07 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-
eye/wp/2013/04/08/sequesters-means-11-percent-cut-in-unemployment-benefits/. 
 10  Pam Fessler, Sequester Puts Some Needing Housing Aid ‘Back To Square One’, NPR, 
Apr. 30, 2013, http://www.npr.org/2013/04/30/180100067 
/sequester-puts-some-needing-housing-aid-back-to-square-one. 
 11  Larry Abramson, Sequester Has Air Force Clipping Its Wings, NPR May 11, 2013, 
http://www.npr.org/2013/05/11/183014086/sequester-has-air-force-clipping-its-
wings.  
 12  Sequester Budget Cuts To Hit FAA, May Trigger Nationwide Delays, CBS N.Y. Apr. 
21, 2013, http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2013/04/21 
/sequester-budget-cuts-hit-faa-may-ground-flights/.  
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delayed and cancelled and airline passengers found themselves 
stranded for hours at a time.13  Politicians, of course, stepped bravely 
to the microphone and said, “Sorry, but this is the course we’ve 
chosen.  We all need to tighten our belts in these tough times.”  Well, 
no.  Congress sprung swiftly into action; and by May 1, President 
Obama had signed legislation to redirect the spending cuts so that 
the FAA could go back to full capacity.14  Airline travel returned to 
normal.15 
This story raises several questions, all of which bear upon an 
important feature of our current democracy.  Why was Congress 
debating ways to reduce deficits in the first place when the American 
people have said consistently since the nadir of the Great Recession 
that their first priority is to put their friends and neighbors back to 
work?16  Why in the scope of that debate did Congress focus so heavily 
on cutting spending and barely consider ways to raise trillions of 
dollars more revenue?  Why did the cuts that Congress enacted fall 
disproportionately on the backs of the neediest citizens?17  And, 
finally, why did Congress rush to appease a certain segment of the 
population—regular air travelers—while ignoring the much more 
dire conditions of those whose very livelihoods were threatened by 
the sequester? 
 
 13  Genevieve Shaw Brown, Matt Gutman, Sarah Herndon, and Sarah Parnass, 
Sequester Cuts, Resulting Furloughs Cause Flight Delays, ABC NEWS Apr. 22, 2013, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Travel/forced-furloughs-flight-delays/story?id=19013206. 
 14  Josh Lederman, Obama Signs Bill to Fix Flight Delays Stemming from Spending Cuts 
that Led to FAA Furloughs, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS May 1, 2013, 
http://news.yahoo.com/obama-signs-bill-fix-flight-delays-stemming-spending-
192139192.html. 
 15  Keith Laing, Flight Delays Peter Out as Air Tower Staffing Returns to Normal, THE 
HILL May 11, 2013, http://thehill.com/blogs/transportation-report/tsa/299145-
flight-delays-peter-out-as-air-tower-staffing-returns-to-normal. 
 16  Some might argue that a significant number of voters see deficit reduction as 
a way to create jobs, as opposed to a competing priority.  First, economists have 
pointed out that this argument has little to no basis in fact or experience.  See, e.g., 
Dean Baker, Deficit Reduction Won’t Create Jobs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT Feb. 10, 
2012, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2012/02/10
/deficit-reduction-wont-create-jobs.  More important, when asked to choose directly 
between cutting the deficit and other measures clearly intended to spur job creation, 
the majority of the public chooses the latter.  See, e.g., J. Mijin Cha, Why is Washington 
Reducing the Deficit Instead of Creating Jobs?, DEMOS Dec. 7, 2012, 
http://www.demos.org/publication/why-washington-reducing-deficit-instead-
creating-jobs. 
 17  See, e.g., Kelsey Sheehy, Sequester Cuts Gut Schools Serving Neediest Students, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REPORT May 28, 2013, http://www.usnews.com /education
/blogs/high-school-notes/2013/05/28/sequester-cuts-gut-schools-serving-neediest-
students. 
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This article presents one answer to these questions, an answer 
grounded in the troubling relationship between wealth inequality 
and democratic representation in the United States.  Drawing on 
compelling recent political science evidence, I will argue that the 
wealthy have systemically different policy preferences than the 
general public; that government in the United States responds 
differentially (and sometimes exclusively) to the policy preferences of 
the wealthy; that this skewed responsiveness has led to economic 
policies that favor the already-rich; and that this is substantially due to 
the outsized influence of a small minority of wealthy donors who 
largely determine who runs for office and whom is elected to 
positions of power.  Ultimately, the United States is caught in a 
vicious cycle wherein the wealthy dominate the democratic process, 
use their political power to craft favorable economic rules, and then 
channel their increased riches back into further political control. 
Further, I argue that our current predicament is due not to the 
American public being unaware of the problem or unwilling to take 
action, but rather to the current structure of American constitutional 
law.  Specifically, over the past four decades, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has eviscerated key protections that prevent wealthy interests and 
individuals from translating economic might directly into political 
power.  In the process, the Court has turned the First Amendment 
into a tool for use by the wealthy to dominate the political process, 
and the key barrier to democratizing the role of money in politics.  
The justices—often (but not always) with bare majorities—have done 
this by adhering to a crude libertarian orthodoxy and ignoring the 
central place of political equality in American history and 
constitutional tradition. 
Finally, I will argue that the best way to reverse the current 
vicious cycle is to transform the Court’s jurisprudence around money 
in politics and empower the People to act through democratic means 
to create a democracy in which the strength of a citizen’s voice does 
not depend upon the size of her wallet. 
II. THE DISPROPORTIONATE INFLUENCE OF THE WEALTHY AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES 
A. The Wealthy Have Different Policy Preferences 
My argument starts with a premise so basic that it may seem 
unremarkable.  Common sense dictates that the wealthiest Americans 
may hold different preferences and priorities than average-earning 
LIOZ (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2013  2:20 PM 
1232 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1227 
 
citizens.  The wealthy, after all, do not look, live, or work like typical 
members of the general public, so why should they think like them? 
This premise, while perhaps obvious, is critical.  If the wealthy 
held substantially the same views—or the same distribution of views, 
more accurately—as the general public, then their outsized influence 
on government policy,18 while still unfair, would not skew policy 
outcomes, and so might not be a matter of pressing concern for non-
wealthy citizens. 
Recently, social scientists have put this foundational premise to 
the test.  In an important 2012 book called Affluence and Influence: 
Economic Inequality and Political Power in America,19 Princeton political 
scientist Martin Gilens examined the policy preferences of Americans 
up and down the income spectrum and studied government 
responsiveness to their concerns.  I shall return to Gilens’s central 
findings about responsiveness below, but for now I will simply note 
that he did indeed report significant differences in public opinion 
based upon wealth.20  These differences exist in spite of the fact that 
Gilens was not able to study those he considered “truly rich.”  Due to 
data limitations, he focused on Americans at the 90th income 
percentile, earning at least $135,000 per year in 2010 (whom he 
refers to as “the affluent”).21 
A more recent study called Democracy and the Policy Preferences of 
Wealthy Americans22 takes an important step towards solving the data 
problem that Gilens identifies, and gives us an unprecedented 
window into the opinions of the very wealthy—a population that is 
extremely difficult to study.  In 2011, study authors worked with 
experienced outreach experts at the University of Chicago to 
interview a representative sample of very wealthy respondents in the 
Chicago metropolitan area.  Interviewees had a mean wealth of $14 
million, a median wealth of $7.5 million, and an average yearly 
 
 18  See infra Part II.B. 
 19  MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND 
POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA (2012). 
 20  Id. at 78 (“Low- and high-income respondents express comparable levels of 
support (within 5 percentage points) on about one-third of the proposed policy 
changes in my dataset, and middle- and high-income respondents agree on about 
half the proposed changes.”). 
 21  Id. at 2. 
 22  Benjamin I. Page, Larry M. Bartels & Jason Seawright, Democracy and the Policy 
Preferences of Wealthy Americans, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 51 (2013), available at 
http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~jnd260/cab/CAB2012%20-%20Page1.pdf  
[hereinafter Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans]. 
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income of slightly more than $1 million.23 
The study confirms and extends Gilens’s findings, reporting that 
the policy preferences of the very rich differ substantially from those 
of the general public—especially on key questions about how to 
structure the economy.  Let’s take as our first example the question 
posed above—whether government should prioritize creating jobs or 
reducing the deficit.  Polling over the past few years has shown that 
the general public has been consistently more concerned with job 
creation and economic growth than with reducing the deficit, often 
by two-to-one margins or more.24 
The wealthy, on the other hand, regularly list deficit reduction 
as a higher priority than do their less-wealthy peers.  The authors of 
Policy Preferences reported that in their survey of the very rich, “[o]ne 
third (32%) of all open-ended responses mentioned budget deficits 
or excessive government spending, far more than mentioned any 
other issue,” and, while a large percentage of respondents listed 
unemployment and education as very important problems, “each of 
these problems was mentioned as the most important by only 11%, 
making them a distant second to budget deficits among the concerns 
of wealthy Americans.”25  This finding is confirmed by a September 
2012 Economist survey in which respondents earning more than 
$100,000 per year were more than twice as likely as middle- or lower-
income respondents to name the budget deficit as the most 
important issue to them.26  The deficit was the issue listed as most 
important by the largest percentage of the wealthy, except for “the 
economy” more generally, which was listed as most important by all 
income groups.27 
This disparity is not an aberration.  The Policy Preferences study 
demonstrates that there are significant differences across a range of 
issues related to the role that government should play in the 
economy.  More than three times the percentage of the general 
public (68%) than the wealthy (19%) believe that “the government 
 
 23  Id. at 53. 
 24  David Callahan & J. Mijin Cha, Stacked Deck: How the Dominance of Politics by the 
Affluent and Business Undermines Economic Mobility in America, DEMOS (Feb. 2013), at 5–
6, http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Demos-Stacked-Deck.pdf; 
see also J. Mijin Cha, supra note 16. 
 25  Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans, supra note 22, at 55.  
 26  YouGov, The Economist/YouGov Poll: September 29-October 1, 2012, at 6, YOUGOV 
(2012), http://cdn.yougov.com/cumulus_uploads/document/xbqkxc7r1n
/econTabReport.pdf.  
 27  Id. 
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in Washington ought to see to it that everyone who wants to work can 
find a job.”28  Nearly twice the percentage of the public (78%) than 
the wealthy (40%) support a minimum wage “high enough so that no 
family with a full time worker falls below the official poverty line.”29  A 
majority of the public believes that “the federal government should 
provide jobs for everyone able and willing to work who cannot find a 
job in private employment,” whereas just 8% of wealthy respondents 
agree.30  In the Economist poll cited above, 18% of respondents 
making less than $40,000 per year listed social security as the most 
important issue, whereas just 1% of the wealthy chose social security.31 
There is still plenty of research to be done on this important 
topic.  For example, it is not clear exactly why preferences differ so 
sharply; how much of the difference is a result of diverging 
experiences and worldviews producing different conceptions of the 
public good, and how much is bald self-interest?32  But, so far, 
rigorous analysis confirms common senseon key questions 
regarding how to structure our economy, the wealthy hold 
significantly different opinions and preferences than everyone else. 
B. Government Responds Mostly to the Preferences of the Wealthy 
The differing policy preferences of the wealthy would not be 
cause for concern if their actual influence on public policy accorded 
with their numbers.  The top one percent—or one tenth of one 
percent—may desire very different outcomes than the broad public; 
but by definition there are not very many people in this elite cadre, 
and so they would not be able to achieve their desired ends without 
convincing a large number of their fellow citizens of the wisdom of 
their preferences.  This is how we would hope a democracy—
characterized by a rough form of political equality consistent with the 
principle of one person, one vote—would operate. 
It will surprise no one that in fact the wealthy are able to exert 
disproportionate influence on the political process.  But the degree 
 
 28  Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans, supra note 22, at 57. 
 29  Id.  
 30  Id.  
 31  The Economist/YouGov Poll: September 29-October 1, 2012, supra note 26. 
 32  In a piece that cites the Policy Preferences study, Paul Krugman writes, “the years 
since we turned to austerity have been dismal for workers but not at all bad for the 
wealthy, who have benefited from surging profits and stock prices even as long-term 
unemployment festers.”  Paul Krugman, Austerity Doctrine Only Benefits the Wealthy, 
HOUSTON CHRONICLE Apr. 26, 2013, http://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook
/article/Krugman-Austerity-doctrine-only-benefits-the-4466944.php. 
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of disparity of influence that Gilens documented in Affluence and 
Influence, when he set out to measure what he calls the 
“preference/policy link” across the economic spectrum, may surprise 
even some of the most seasoned political observers.33  Gilens writes: 
The American government does respond to the public’s 
preferences, but that responsiveness is strongly tilted toward 
the most affluent citizens.  Indeed, under most 
circumstances, the preferences of the vast majority of 
Americans appear to have essentially no impact on which 
policies the government does or doesn’t adopt. . . .34 
. . . . 
The complete lack of government responsiveness to the 
preferences of the poor is disturbing and seems consistent 
only with the most cynical views of American politics . . . . 
[M]edian-income Americans fare no better than the poor 
when their policy preferences diverge from those of the 
well-off.35 
He continues by describing explicitly the power of the preferences of 
the affluent to override those of the much more numerous poor and 
middle class: 
[F]or Americans below the top of the income distribution, 
any association between preferences and policy outcomes is 
likely to reflect the extent to which their preferences 
coincide with those of the affluent. . . .36 
. . . . 
We saw above that less-well-off Americans have little 
influence over policy outcomes when their preferences 
diverge from those of the affluent.  [Additional data 
described] show that this is true not only for the poor and 
the middle class considered separately . . . but for those 
policies on which the poor and middle class are closely 
aligned in opposition to the affluent.37 
This is truly a remarkable finding: when the preferences of the 
wealthiest 10 percent of Americans conflict with that of the rest of the 
population, the 10 percent trumps the 90 percent. 
While the affluent are quite dominant across the board, the 
divergence of influence is not equal across policy domains.  Gilens 
 
 33  GILENS, supra note 19, at 4. 
 34  Id. at 1. 
 35  Id. at 81. 
 36  Id. at 83.   
 37  Id. at 84.   
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finds that “the starkest difference in responsiveness to the affluent 
and the middle class occurs on economic policy, a consequence of 
high-income Americans’ stronger opposition to taxes and corporate 
regulation . . . .”38  He concludes that “we would expect greater 
representational equality in the economic sphere to result in a higher 
minimum wage, more generous unemployment benefits, stricter 
corporate regulation (including the oil and gas industries in 
particular), and a more progressive personal tax regime in general.”39 
Finally, Gilens notes that matters seem to be getting worse.  “The 
analyses of change over time,” he describes, “do reveal an important 
general trend: the strengthening of policy responsiveness for affluent 
Americans.”40  This is important because it suggests that government 
responsiveness to the wealthy is not a constant (and some would say 
inevitable) state, but rather is itself responsive to particular policy or 
economic conditions. 
In the end, his exhaustive study of the “preference/policy” link 
in the United States leads Gilens to some fairly stark and depressing 
conclusions about the state of American democracy.  At various 
points throughout the book he writes that “[t]he concentration of 
political influence among Americans at the top of the income 
distribution is incompatible with the core democratic principle of 
political equality,”41 and “[t]he patterns of responsiveness found in 
previous chapters often correspond more closely to a plutocracy than 
to a democracy.”42 
C. Economic Policy: By and for the One Percent 
The consequences of a wealthy elite with distinct preferences 
and priorities, especially on core economic issues, and a government 
that responds disproportionately (or exclusively) to the preferences 
of this elite segment of society are not hard to predict.  We would 
expect a series of policies that benefit economic incumbents rather 
than fostering cross-class opportunity and mobility. 
As Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson document extensively in their 
2010 book Winner-Take-All Politics,43 this is exactly what the past several 
 
 38  Id. at 101. 
 39  GILENS, supra note 19, at 117. 
 40  Id. at 193. 
 41  Id. at 83. 
 42  Id. at 234. 
 43  JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW 
WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 
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decades have wrought in the United States.  We have entered an era 
of profound economic inequality in this country.  Hacker and 
Pierson write: 
A generation ago, the United States was a recognizable, if 
somewhat more unequal, member of the cluster of affluent 
democracies known as mixed economies, where fast growth 
was widely shared.  No more.  Since around 1980, we have 
drifted away from that mixed-economy cluster, and traveled 
a considerable distance toward another: the capitalist 
oligarchies, like Brazil, Mexico, and Russia, with their much 
greater concentration of economic bounty.44 
Exhibit A is the overwhelming share of national economic 
growth that has accrued to the very top of the income scale over the 
past few decades.  Citing a Congressional Budget Office report 
covering the years 1979–2006, Hacker and Pierson reported that 
average after-tax income of the richest one percent increased by 
nearly 260% over that period.45  Income of the poorest 20%, in 
contrast, rose only a modest 10%, and those in the middle quintile 
rose 21%.46  But, even these latter increases are due entirely to 
working more hours, not sharing in the gains of increased 
productivity.  “Without those additional hours and income,” the 
authors report, “households in the middle of the distribution would 
have barely nudged up at all.  The incomes of households at the 
bottom would actually have fallen.”47 
More recent data provides no solace.  Economist Emmanuel 
Saez has reported that between 2009 and 2011, the real income of 
99% of the American population shrank by 0.4%, but the top one 
percent saw gains of 11.2%.48  According to the Pew Research Center, 
during the same period, the mean net worth of the eight million 
households in the top 7% of the wealth distribution increased by 
28%, while mean wealth of the remaining households dropped by 
4%.49 
 
(2010). 
 44  Id. at 3–4. 
 45  Id. at 22. 
 46  Id. 
 47  Id. (citations omitted). 
 48  Emmanual Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of the Top Incomes in the United 
States (Updated with 2011 Estimates), Jan. 23, 2013, http://elsa.berkeley.edu
/~saez /saez-UStopincomes-2011.pdf. 
 49  The Uneven Economic Recovery: Wealth of Upper 7% Rises, While Less-Affluent See 
Declines, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (May 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/daily-
number/the-uneven-economic-recovery-wealth-of-upper-7-rises-while-less-affluent-see-
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The most common defense of economic inequality is that it is 
merit-based.  The primary proof of this is that it is fluid, responsive to 
talent and effort rather than locked-in by happenstance of birth.  The 
United States may be unequal, say some, but it is mobile.  In America, 
we don’t seek equality of outcome, but rather pride ourselves in 
equality of opportunity. 
Unfortunately, Hacker and Pierson demonstrate that this, while 
perhaps true in a bygone era, is no longer the case: 
The American Dream portrays the United States as a 
classless society where anyone can rise to the top, regardless 
of family background.  Yet, there is more intergenerational 
mobility in Australia, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Germany, 
Spain, France, and Canada.  In fact, of affluent countries 
studied, only Britain and Italy have lower intergenerational 
mobility than the United States does (and they are basically 
even with the U.S.). . . .  In the United States, more than 
half of the earnings advantage (or disadvantage) of fathers 
is passed on to sons.  In Canada, only about a fifth or less is.  
And, almost all of the difference is accounted for by the fact 
that Americans are much more likely to be stuck at the 
bottom or secure at the top than are Canadians.50 
Why is this so?  Why has inequality increased so dramatically and 
mobility stalled?  Hacker and Pierson dismiss several of the typical 
explanations51 and place the blame squarely with government 
policies.  These policies come, broadly, in two forms—one obvious 
and a second much less so. 
The first type of government policy affects economic outcomes 
directly through taxes and other distributive (or redistributive) 
means.  By examining what Hacker and Pierson term the “truly 
advantaged,” they show that the extremely wealthy “are not simply 
richer because their paychecks have grown; they’re richer because 
government taxes them much less heavily than it once did.”52  As a 
prime example, the authors report that “[t]he top 0.1 percent had 
about 7.3 percent of the total national after-tax income in 2000, up 
from 1.2 percent in 1970.  If the effect of taxes on their income had 
remained what it was in 1970, they would have had about 4.5 percent 
 
declines/.  
 50  HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 43, at 29 (2010). 
 51  They examine and reject “skill-biased technological change,” for example.  Id. 
at 34–40. 
 52  Id. at 48. 
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of after-tax income.”53  In addition, by failing to update existing 
policies (a phenomenon the authors term “drift”), “the percentage 
by which government taxes and benefits reduced inequality fell . . . by 
more than a quarter” between 1980 and 2003.54  A new international 
study also reports that in countries in which the wealthy have 
experienced sizable gains in income share over the past five decades, 
top earners also experienced stark reductions in marginal tax rates.55 
The second type of government policy that Hacker and Pierson 
highlight is less obvious in its impact on economic equality but likely 
more profound.  Cass Sunstein has pointed out, in another context, 
that the essential problem with the infamous Supreme Court decision 
Lochner v. New York56 inhered in its assumption that markets were pre-
political and that government regulation always and everywhere 
represented (presumably unjust) interference with this blissful state 
of nature.57  The reality is that governments always and everywhere 
create and shape markets by setting the rules of the game.  The only 
questions are what these rules will be and whom they will benefit. 
Hacker and Pierson build upon this insight, pointing out that 
through weak rules governing the right to form a union, lack of 
regulations on executive pay, the revocation of basic regulations on 
capital markets, and more, the U.S. government has structured an 
economy well-tailored to accelerate economic inequality and frustrate 
the ambitions of working families.58  To this list, one might add the 
declining real value of the minimum wage,59 receding per-pupil 
investment in public higher education,60 tax loopholes, and direct 
subsidies benefiting large corporations at the expense of small 
businesses.61 
 
 53  Id. at 49 (citations omitted). 
 54  Id. at 52 (citations omitted). 
 55  Dylan Matthews, Surprise! When the Rich Get Richer, Taxes Go Lower, WASH. POST 
BLOG (May 28, 2013, 1:02 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/blogs /wonkblog/wp/2013/05/28/surprise-when-the-rich-get-richer-taxes-go-
lower/?wprss=rss_ezra-klein.  
 56  198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 57  See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987); Cass 
Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390, 1397 
(1994) [hereinafter Political Equality and Unintended Consequences]. 
 58  HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 43, at 54–72. 
 59  Callahan & Cha, supra note 24, at 12–13. 
 60  See, e.g., John Quinterno & Viany Orozco, The Great Cost Shift: How Higher 
Education Cuts Undermine the Future Middle Class, DEMOS (Apr. 3, 2012), at 14–15, 
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/TheGreatCostShift_Demos.
pdf. 
 61  See, e.g., Joseph Rotella & Dennis Van Roekel, How Everyone Else Pays for Big 
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The bottom line is that public policy inevitably shapes our 
economy, and it either does so in ways that foster opportunity and 
mobility or it puts a thumb on the scale in favor of the already-haves.  
The accumulated evidence demonstrates that at least since the late 
1970s, U.S. economic policy has accelerated wealth inequality and 
stalled economic mobility. 
III. HOW THE VICIOUS CYCLE SPINS 
Why, in a democracy—where each citizen in theory has equal 
voting power, and where votes are the ultimate arbiter of who ascends 
to political power—would a government comprised of elected 
officials respond so differentially to a small group of citizens and 
consistently craft policy designed to serve this elite? 
A.  The Wealthy Exhibit Greater Participation in All Aspects of Civic 
and Political Life . . . 
One answer is that the members of this small group are much 
more active citizens.  Voter registration and turnout rates consistently 
rise with income and wealth.62  In a landmark study called The 
Unheavenly Chorus (which is itself an update of a prior study called 
Voice and Equality), three scholars document the various ways in which 
socio-economic status is positively correlated with political 
participation even beyond these basic metrics.63  In a 2008 survey, for 
example, the median income of registered voters was 9% higher than 
respondents as a whole; and campaign workers had incomes a full 
27% higher than was typical for the sample.64  The positive 
correlation holds true for group membership as well.  “[T]hose at the 
top of the [socio-economic status] ladder,” the authors report, “are 
much more likely than those lower down to be affiliated with a 
political organization and to indicate that they have attended a 
meeting, that they have been active . . . or that they have served as a 
 
Business’s Tax Breaks, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT Apr. 5, 2012, 
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2012/04/05/how-everyone-else-pays-for-
big-businesss-tax-breaks; Robert P. Murphy, Welfare for the Rich: 
The Wealthy Receive Billions of Dollars in Government Subsidies Each Year, THE 
FOUNDATION FOR ECONOMIC EDUCATION Apr. 1, 2007, 
http://www.fee.org/the_freeman/detail/welfare-for-the-rich.  
 62  See, e.g., Callahand & Cha, supra note 24, at 17. 
 63  KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, SIDNEY VERBA & HENRY E. BRADY, THE UNHEAVENLY 
CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY (2012). 
 64  Id. at 240–41. 
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board member or officer of an organization that takes stands in 
politics.”65 
B.  . . . But Their Outsized Influence is Most Pronounced When They 
Spend Money 
The reality, however, is that because the wealthy are so few and 
the rest of the population so many, even large differences in voting 
rates and other forms of civic participation would not likely, on their 
own, lead directly to the extreme differential in responsiveness 
described above.  The top 1% of Americans would have to vote at 
twenty times the rate of the bottom quintile in order to simply cancel 
out the poorest Americans’ votes; but this is not possible since the 
discrepancy in turnout between the top and bottom quintiles has 
historically hovered around 30%—a significant gap to be sure, but 
not enough to enable the wealthy to simply vote their way to more 
power.66  Other forms of civic participation can have a multiplier 
effect, enabling well-off citizens to influence fellow citizens and raise 
the profile of certain issues or causes.  But, as the authors of 
Unheavenly Chorus point out, even if the wealthy have more time to 
volunteer with citizen organizations, canvass their neighbors, or join 
boards, time is a finite resource.67 
It is when the wealthy make use of their greatest comparative 
advantage, by breaking out their checkbooks, that they can multiply 
their influence in virtually unlimited ways.  It is the role of money in 
contemporary American politics that, more than any other single 
factor, drives government’s differential and undemocratic 
responsiveness to the wealthy.68 
Broadly speaking, there are three basic ways to use money to 
influence policy in a democracy.  One can spend money to shape 
public opinion such that policymakers responsive to such opinion will 
enact favored rules.  One can spend money to help place into 
positions of power people who are sympathetic to one’s views and 
 
 65  Id. at 377. 
 66  Jan E. Leighley & Jonathan Nagler, Class Bias in the U.S. Electorate, 1972-2004, 
Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association 
(Aug. 26, 2006) (unpublished manuscript available at http://www.nyu.edu/gsas
/dept /politics/faculty/nagler/apsa2006_rv7.pdf).  
 67  SCHLOZMAN, VERBA, & BRADY, supra note 63.  
 68  Gilens comes to the same conclusion himself, noting that “any effort to 
strengthen the influence of less-affluent Americans over federal policy must address 
the highly skewed sources of individual campaign donations.”  GILENS, supra note 19 
at 247.   
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preferences—that is, help elect public officials.  And, one can spend 
money to influence those officials once they are in power, through 
lobbying, further campaign contributions, or even outright bribery.  
No doubt, each of these types of spending contributes to the vicious 
cycle I am describing in this Article.  Nonetheless, for several reasons, 
I will focus on the use of money to help elect public officials. 
I do not focus on the use of money to shape public opinion for 
two basic reasons.  First, as Gilens and Page have demonstrated in 
their research, substantial differences in policy preferences between 
the wealthy and average-earning citizens persist, especially on 
economic issues.  So, although wealthy donors do spend billions of 
dollars attempting to shape public opinion on many issues of direct 
relevance to the economy—such as the importance of deficits,69 the 
existence (or fabrication) of global warming,70 and the best strategies 
for public education71—this spending has not caused the preferences 
of the general public to align with those of wealthy activists.72  Second, 
this problem is extraordinarily difficult to solve, and it is not 
immediately clear how the solution recommended below can be 
applied. 
I do not focus on attempts to influence already elected officials 
for a few reasons.  Outright bribery, of course, is already illegal and 
by most accounts fairly rare in American politics.73  Lobbying, on the 
other hand, is a multi-billion dollar industry and a legitimate 
candidate for the role of prime mover in the vicious cycle.74  But, it is 
 
 69  See, e.g., Max Berley & Brian Faler, Peterson’s $1 Billion Bet Shows Return as Deficit 
Concerns Rise, BLOOMBERG July 1, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-
01/peterson-s-1-billion-investment-shows-returns-as-deficit-concerns-mount.html. 
 70  See, e.g., Koch Industries: Still Fueling Climate Denial 2011 Update, GREENPEACE 
Apr. 14, 2011, http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/en/media-center/reports/Koch-
Industries-Still-Fueling-Climate-Denial-2011-Update/. 
 71  See, e.g., Valarie Strauss, Bill Gates Expands Influence—and Money—Into Higher 
Education, WASH. POST July 15, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-
sheet/wp/2013/07/15/bill-gates-expands-influence-and-money-into-higher-
education/. 
 72  See, e.g., discussion in Section II.A, supra. 
 73  See, e.g., Stephen K. Medvic, There is Very Little Corruption in U.S. Politics, N.Y. 
TIMES Apr. 3, 2013 http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/04/03/are-rich-
politicians-less-corruptible/there-is-very-little-corruption-in-us-politics (“[I]n any 
given year, only a minuscule percentage of the more than 500,000 elected officials in 
the United States are brought up on charges of corruption.”). 
 74  See, e.g., Lee Drutman, The Business of America is Lobbying: Explaining the Growth 
of Corporate Political Activity in Washington D.C., LEEDRUTMAN.COM, 
http://www.leedrutman.com/uploads/2/3/0/1/2301208/business_of_america_is_l
obbying.pdf; see also HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 43.  The impact of lobbying, 
however, is beyond the scope of this article. 
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my view that helping place people into positions of authority who 
share one’s ideological perspective, worldview, and general life 
experiences is a more powerful way to shape policy than is 
persuading those already in power to take a desired position.  The 
former strategy tends to shape the field of alternatives and the latter 
tends to influence decisions within that already-determined field of 
acceptable outcomes.75 
I acknowledge that my view about the primary role of the 
influence of money on elections versus on politicians is a contested 
one.76  More important, the role of lobbying is largely beyond the 
scope of this Article because the story of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence discussed below and the solutions that I propose do 
not touch directly on the role of lobbying, at least in the shorter 
term. 
C.  Wealthy Donors Shape Election Contests 
Wealthy donors’ first and key mechanism for influencing policy 
is by determining who runs for office and who wins elections in the 
United States. 
1.  Who Runs: The Wealth Primary 
Over the past several decades, the cost of running for office in 
the United States has increased dramatically.77  In the 2012 election 
cycle, the average winning U.S. House candidate raised more than 
$1.6 million and the average winning Senate candidate raised nearly 
$10.5 million.78  Fundraising figures for the most competitive races 
 
 75  See discussion infra Part IV.C  (expanding upon this view). 
 76  Gilens’s work provides some evidence for this view.  In his chapter about 
interest groups, he writes that his “findings suggest that representational inequality 
cannot be blamed on the power of organized interests.  Particular groups do 
undermine the interests of the public on specific issues, but on other occasions 
interest groups align with public preferences (even if those groups are motivated by 
their own narrow concerns).”  GILENS, supra note 19, at 124.  He also finds specific 
evidence that, counter to expectations, interest groups do not in fact accelerate the 
gap in the preference/policy link between rich and poor because there is no 
significant alignment between the policy preferences of interest groups and the 
wealthy.  GILENS, supra note 19 at 136.  Others, however, argue that lobbying has a 
profound impact on policy in ways that benefit wealthy, entrenched interests.  Yale 
Law Professor Heather Gerken, for example, argues that lobbying must be 
considered together with campaign finance.  Heather Gerken, Keynote Address: 
Lobbying as the New Campaign Finance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1155 (2011). 
 77  See, e.g., Senate Campaign Expenditures, 1974-2010, CAMPAIGN FINANCE INSTITUTE, 
http://www.cfinst.org/data/pdf/VitalStats_t5.pdf.  
 78  Blair Bowie & Adam Lioz, Billion-Dollar Democracy: The Unprecedented Role of 
LIOZ (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2013  2:20 PM 
1244 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1227 
 
were considerably higher; candidates for the U.S. Senate seat in 
Massachusetts, for example, raised a combined total of nearly $76 
million.79 
This high cost of entry means that well before facing the voters, 
while sitting in a quiet living room deciding whether to mount a 
campaign, any prospective candidate must ask herself two critical 
questions: How much money can I raise?  And, where will I get that 
money?  In a May 2013 speech at Yale University, U.S. Senator Chris 
Murphy, referring to the four to six hours per day he was required to 
dial for dollars, added a similar question to the mix: “Are you willing 
to become a telemarketer for 24 months?”80 
This might not be such a problem if candidates for elected office 
were raising the vast majority of their money from a broad range of 
the constituents they hope to represent.  In that case, fundraising 
would be a proxy for public support and those with the best chance 
of winning would earn the right to face the voters in primaries or 
general elections.  But, in reality, candidates tend to depend upon a 
tiny number of wealthy donors to fund their campaigns.  Candidates 
for the U.S. Senate in 2012, for example, raised 64% of their funds in 
contributions of at least $1,000—from just 0.04% of the U.S. 
population.81 
The situation does not change if we go back several years, or just 
look at primary elections.  For the 2002 congressional primary 
elections, for example, 73% of all federal candidate contributions 
came in contributions of at least $1,000 from just 0.07% of the voting 
age population.82  If anything, as these numbers suggest, candidates 
are likely to be more dependent upon a small network of large 
donors in primary campaigns, before the general voting public is fully 
engaged in the race. 
 
Money in the 2012 Elections, DEMOS & U.S. PIRG EDUCATION FUND (January 2013), at 
18, http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications
/BillionDollarDemocracy_Demos.pdf. 
 79  Most Expensive Races: 2012 Overview, OPENSECRETS, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/overview/topraces.php?cycle=2012&display=allcands 
(last visited May 14, 2013).  
 80  Paul Blumenthal, Chris Murphy: ‘Soul-Crushing’ Fundraising is Bad for Congress, 
HUFFINGTON POST May 7, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/07/chris-
murphy-fundraising_n_3232143.html. 
 81  Bowie & Lioz, supra note 78, at 13. 
 82  Adam Lioz, The Wealth Primary: The Role of Big Money in the 2002 Congressional 
Primaries, U.S. PIRG EDUCATION FUND (Oct. 2002) at 10–12, 
http://cdn.publicinterestnetwork.org/assets/FO6yyVgGizvg2SBwWcd08g/roleofmo
ney2003.pdf [hereinafter The Wealth Primary]. 
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This means that as a practical matter, the three fundraising 
questions for candidates posed above can be merged into one: do I 
have access to a substantial network of wealthy donors who can afford 
to make large contributions (of $1,000 or more) to my campaign?  
One would assume that those who can afford to write checks of 
$1,000, $2,000, or more are wealthier than average-earning citizens.  
Two pieces of data confirm this common-sense conclusion.  First, a 
nationwide survey found that 81% of those who gave contributions of 
at least $200 during the 1996 congressional elections reported annual 
family incomes greater than $100,000.83  Additionally, in Policy 
Preferences of Wealthy Americans, the authors found that more than two-
thirds of the extremely wealthy respondents interviewed contributed 
money to candidates or political organizations over the previous 
twelve months, and more than one-fifth of them helped solicit or 
“bundle” other people’s contributions.84 
Given this confluence of wealth and campaign financing, it 
makes sense to speak of a coherent “donor class.”85  This donor class 
has two critical features relevant for the purposes of this Article: it 
holds systemically different policy preferences than the general 
public and it wields tremendous, and arguably decisive, influence 
over who runs effectively for office.  This circumstance—and the 
widespread knowledge of this circumstance among aspiring elected 
officials—gives the donor class incredible power to shape the agenda 
in Washington and in state capitals across the country. 
The first type of power wielded by the donor class is the power to 
set the alternatives by shaping the field of candidates.  Our big-money 
system helps wealthy donors do this in two main ways.  First, it 
narrows the field of viable candidates.  Through a process that legal 
scholars and advocates have called the “wealth primary,” large donors 
act as gatekeepers, determining which types of aspiring public 
servants are able to get on the playing field in a meaningful way.86  
Affluence and Influence author Martin Gilens recognizes this 
phenomenon and writes that “[a]ffluent contributors . . . serve as a 
political filter mechanism; without the support of a sufficient core of 
well-off contributors, a prospective candidate has little chance of 
 
 83  Bowie & Lioz, supra note 78, at 15. 
 84  Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans, supra note 22, at 54. 
 85  See generally Spencer Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, 
and Participation, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 73 (2004). 
 86  See Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical 
Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160, 1162 (1994); The 
Wealth Primary, supra note 82. 
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mounting a competitive campaign.”87  Qualified, credible candidates 
who either lack access to networks of large donors or fail to shade 
their positions in the proper direction are filtered out of the system, 
dropping out of races, deciding not to run in the first place, or losing 
primary elections.88  One stark example of how this filtering process 
narrows the field is the notable lack of representatives in Congress 
and state legislatures who have previously held working-class jobs.  As 
Nicholas Carnes reports in his new book White-Collar Government: The 
Hidden Role of Class in Economic Policy Making, more than half of 
American citizens hold working-class jobs, and yet only 3% of state 
legislators and less than 2% of members of Congress previously held 
a similar job.89 
In filtering candidates, wealthy donors may also be adversely 
affecting the overall quality of our representation.  Aside from 
denying us the talents of the broadest possible set of public servants, 
we may actually be selecting politicians whose primary focus is raising 
money rather than crafting public policy.  As Senator Murphy noted, 
“the skill of telemarketing does not translate into the skill of 
governing.”90 
Second, the wealth primary system changes the candidates who 
do run.  Those wishing to secure a chance to appear before the voters 
in a primary or general election are (often irresistibly) tempted to 
align their policy positions and priorities with those of the narrow set 
of people they court for large contributions.91 
Take the minimum wage as just one example.  As discussed 
above, the vast majority of Americans support a minimum wage that 
is much higher than the current $7.25 per hour.92  But, few among 
the donor class surveyed for the Policy Preferences study support a 
 
 87  GILENS, supra note 19, at 244. 
 88  Adam Lioz, Look Who’s Not Coming to Washington: Qualified Candidates Shut Out 
by Big Money, U.S. PIRG EDUCATION FUND (Jan. 2003), 
http://cdn.publicinterestnetwork.org/assets/kg3KuycG2E8nlXOgCyKbTw/lookwho
snot1_03.pdf. 
 89  NICHOLAS CARNES, WHITE-COLLAR GOVERNMENT: THE HIDDEN ROLE OF CLASS IN 
ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING (2013) at 4–5.   
 90  Opening Address by Senator Chris Murphy, Purchasing Power: Money, 
Politics, and Inequality, 2013 Spring Convening of the Yale Institute for Social and 
Policy Studies, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v
=kLfVpET_r5A&list=PLqHnHG5X2PXAo8rhYsOVedp0V8Kiwnylh&index=3. 
 91  See, e.g., MARTIN SCHRAM, SPEAKING FREELY: FORMER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS TALK 
ABOUT MONEY IN POLITICS (1995). 
 92  See Minimum Wage Laws in the States, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR 
DIV., http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm (last visited Aug. 12, 2013).  
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substantial increase.93  This creates both an advantage for candidates 
who do not support the minimum wage, and an incentive for those 
who do to shade or downplay their positions on the issue.  To be 
sure, in many districts this will not be a factor—the constituent 
landscape is either so solidly for or against an increase that 
candidates are unlikely to take a different position (and sophisticated 
donors are unlikely to expect that they would).  But, in more 
competitive districts in which the sentiment of the electorate is less 
certain, the subtle skewing of candidate positions to please 
gatekeeper donors is more likely.  And, on third or fourth tier issues 
that are less electorally salient—because the electorate is less 
knowledgeable or focused on those issues—the incentive to please 
donors is even greater.94 
Some courageous candidates for federal office have talked 
openly about this phenomenon.  Miles Rapoport is the current 
President of Demos and a former Connecticut state legislator and 
Connecticut Secretary of State.95  In 1998, Rapoport ran for Congress, 
and he described his experience dialing for dollars: 
Every night I would lock myself in a room with a bag of 
chips and some strong coffee and make my calls, homing in 
on people who could ideally give me at least $500 or $1000 
or more.  And, when I was talking with these potential 
donors I found that their problems and concerns weren’t 
the same as the majority of folks I was looking to represent 
in Congress.  I heard a lot about how excessive regulations 
were strangling their business or health care costs for their 
workers were a real burden.  I was running as a progressive 
candidate and so my first instinct was to say, “now wait a 
minute, that’s not exactly right.”  But, my goal on the 
phone was to get the contribution.  So, by the end of the 
night, I found myself saying things like “well, that’s an 
interesting point you make and when I’m in Washington 
you should come by and we can talk more about that.”  I 
wasn’t changing my positions, exactly, but there was 
definitely a shift in emphasis, and I could feel myself 
shifting as I spent more and more time talking to a very 
narrow set of wealthy donors.  My sense of what was pressing 
 
 93  Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans, supra note 22, at 57. 
 94  This is because candidates can receive a benefit by appealing to donors 
without paying a corresponding price with the electorate. 
 95  DEMOS, http://www.demos.org/miles-rapoport (last visited Sept. 29 2013).  In 
the interest of transparency, I should note here that Mr. Rapoport is the head of the 
organization for which I work and hence, indirectly, my boss. 
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and important may have been affected, and my sense of 
what types of positions I needed to be open to in order to 
win my race and get into Congress was certainly affected.96 
Senator Murphy echoed this experience, noting that when 
making fundraising appeals, he’s “not call[ing] anyone who could 
not drop at least $1,000,” people, he estimated, who make at least 
$500,000 to $1 million per year.97 
I talked a lot more about carried interest inside of that call 
room than I did in the supermarket . . .  [The people I’m 
calling] have fundamentally different problems than other 
people.  And in Connecticut especially, you spend a lot of 
time on the phone with people who work in the financial 
markets. And so you’re hearing a lot about problems that 
bankers have and not a lot of problems that people who 
work at the mill in Thomaston, Conn., have. You certainly 
have to stop and check yourself.98 
Through controlling the wealth primary, the donor class is able 
to both exert outsized influence on who runs for elected office and to 
incentivize those who do run to take policy positions that are closer to 
their preferences than to those of the general public.  This is the first 
key mechanism through which the wealthy are able to set the agenda 
in legislatures across America. 
2.  Who Wins Elections 
Of course, donors do not simply choose the players and then 
walk off the field.  The donor class engages actively, and largely 
effectively, in giving its preferred candidates the best possible chance 
to win elected office as well. 
As noted, candidates for Congress typically raise a very large 
percentage of their funds from a small minority of wealthy donors.  
In 2012, both House and Senate candidates raised the majority of 
their funds from individuals, as opposed to political action 
committees (PACs) or other sources.99  These individual 
contributions came largely in high-dollar donations.  House and 
Senate candidates raised the majority of these funds in contributions 
 
 96  Mr. Rapoport delivered a version of these remarks at the Yale event covered by 
the Huffington Post and cited supra, note 80.  The author attempted to record the 
remarks faithfully and received Mr. Rapoport’s approval on this text. 
 97  Blumenthal, supra note 80.  
 98  Id. 
 99  Bowie & Lioz, supra note 78, at 12–13. 
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of at least $1,000.100  Senate candidates raised 40% of these funds in 
contributions of at least $2,500.101  Just 25% of individual 
contributions to House candidates and 21% to Senate candidates 
came in contributions of less than $200.102  One or two thousand 
dollars may appear relatively insignificant in the context of 
multimillion dollar campaigns, but when considering that median 
household income in 2011 was $50,054,103 it would be a significant 
percentage of discretionary income for an average-earning family, 
and is likely well more than most families can afford to give to a 
political candidate or cause. 
The post-Citizens United explosion of outside spending has 
further enhanced the power of large donors and increased the 
influence of the super-wealthy in addition to the merely rich.  
Approximately 20 percent of the total 2012 election spending 
reported to the FEC was by outside groups, as opposed to candidates 
or parties.104  Of this reported outside spending, more than 60 
percent was by Super PACs, which can raise unlimited funds from 
individuals, corporations, unions, nonprofits, or other sources.105 
In 2012, 60 percent of Super PAC funding came from just 159 
individuals and institutions contributing at least $1 million.106  The 
top thirty-two Super PAC donors, giving an average of $9.9 million 
each, matched the $313 million that President Obama and Mitt 
Romney raised from all of their small donors combined—at least 3.7 
million people giving less than $200.107 
Focusing just on individuals, rather than including corporations 
or other institutions, yields similar statistics.  Just ninety-nine people, 
who contributed at least $1 million to Super PACs, accounted for 
nearly 60 percent of all individual contributions to the entities.108  
 
 100  Id. at 13. 
 101  Id. 
 102  Id. 
 103  Sabrina Tavernise, U.S. Income Gap Rose, Sign of Uneven Recovery Widening, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2012, at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/13/us
/us-incomes-dropped-last-year-census-bureau-says.html.  
 104  Bowie & Lioz, supra note 78, at 3.  Note that this figure is cited as approximate 
because the FEC has promulgated updated figures since this report was published.  It 
is also important to note that due to inadequate reporting requirements, not all 
funds spent to influence federal elections must be reported to the FEC.  For more on 
this, see id. at 6. 
 105  Id. at 4. 
 106  Id. at 8. 
 107  Id. at 9. 
 108  Id. at 10. 
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Sheldon and Miriam Adelson were the largest Super PAC donors; the 
Adelsons contributed nearly $92 million.109  Although this is clearly a 
large sum, it is less than one-half of 1 percent of their net worth—the 
equivalent of an average American family contributing $285.  It 
would take more than 320,000 average families to match the Adelson 
family’s political giving.110 
After running the numbers on the first presidential election 
cycle after Citizens United, Lee Drutman at the Sunlight Foundation 
concluded that just 1% of 1% (one ten-thousandth) of the U.S. 
population was responsible for more than 28% of all disclosed 
political giving and spending in 2012—“a dubious new landmark” for 
concentration of political clout.111  “[C]andidates got more money 
from a smaller percentage of the population,” Drutman notes, “than 
any year for which we have data.”112  A group of elite donors that can 
fit inside a decent-sized basketball arena is driving political 
fundraising in a nation of more than 300 million people. 
So, does all this money matter?  Does it help candidates win 
elections?  The short answer is that raising and spending more money 
certainly appears to give candidates the best chance to win an 
election—but that money matters to the process either way.  The 
ability to raise and spend money can be an effective candidate filter 
whether money is a key decisive in winning elections, or just 
perceived to be by the active players in the political landscape. 
There was a lot of talk coming out of the 2012 elections that 
“money didn’t matter.”113  In many of the high-profile races, the 
candidates who spent the most or benefited from an influx of outside 
spending did not win.114  And many of the biggest outside spenders 
had poor track records, dumping millions of dollars into losing races 
and racking up generally poor win percentages.115 
 
 109  Id. 
 110  Bowie & Lioz, supra note 78, at 10. 
 111  Lee Drutman, The Political 1% of the 1% in 2012, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION June 
24, 2013, http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/06/24/1pct_of_the_1pct/. 
 112  Id. 
 113  See, e.g., Ezra Klein, We Got Way Too Excited Over Money in the 2012 
Elections, WASH. POST May 6, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs
/wonkblog/wp/2013/05/06/we-got-way-too-excited-over-money-in-the-2012-
elections/. 
 114  Id. 
 115  The Sunlight Foundation reported, for example, that Karl Rove’s American 
Crossroads had a 1.29% return on investment for the cycle.  See Lindsay Young, 
Outside Spenders’ Return on Investment, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION REPORTING GROUP (last 
updated Dec. 17, 2012), http://reporting.sunlightfoundation.com/2012
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There is danger, however, in learning too large of a lesson from 
a small sample of high-profile races in one election year.  It certainly 
appears to be the case that money plays an important role in 
determining election outcomes, as a large percentage of the biggest-
spending candidates regularly win their races and several political 
science studies have found that increases in spending do correlate 
with increased vote share.116 
In the 2012 election cycle, for example, 84% of U.S. House 
candidates and 67% of U.S. Senate “candidates who outspent their 
general election opponents won their elections.”117  If anything, this 
winning percentage appears to be on the low side historically—
between 2004 and 2012 an average of 91% of high-spending House 
candidates and 79% of similar Senate candidates won their general 
election contests.118  Winning House candidates raised 108% more 
money than their major opponents and winning Senate candidates 
raised more than 35% more than their major opponents.119 
Of course, skeptics will rightly claim that correlation should not 
be confused with causation—and there are, indeed, several factors 
that complicate the above picture. 
Many federal general elections are not competitive because 
districts are drawn to virtually assure a victory for one of the two 
major political parties.120  In this situation, we would expect the 
assumptive victor to attract more contributions; and the fundraising 
disparity is more likely the result of the final outcome than the cause 
of it.  On this point, it is worth noting that in primary elections—
where the partisan makeup of the district is a much smaller factor—
candidates who raise and spend the most money routinely win the 
 
/return_on_investment/.  
 116  See, e.g., Alan S. Gerber, Does Campaign Spending Work?: Field Experiments Provide 
Evidence and Suggest New Theory, 47 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCI. 541 (2004); Gary C. Jacobson, 
The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 469–91 
(1978); Don P. Green & Jonathan S. Krasno, Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent: 
Reestimating the Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 884 
(1988); R.S. Erickson & T.R. Palfrey, Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory 
and Data, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 595 (2000). 
 117  Bowie & Lioz, supra note 78, at 18. 
 118  Id. 
 119  Id. at 17. 
 120  The Cook Political Report, considered an authoritative source on competitive 
races, lists 369 of the 435 seats in the House of Representatives (85%) as “solid seats” 
for either Democrats or Republicans for the 2014 election cycle.  COOK POLITICAL 
REPORT, http://cookpolitical.com/house/charts/race-ratings (accessed Sept. 1, 2013 
at 9:27 AM). 
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vast majority of races as well.121 
The “money follows a likely winner” argument, however, can be 
applied more broadly.  And, indeed, when we look just at close races, 
defined as those decided within a ten-point margin, the picture is 
more complex.  In these races, 63.6% of House candidates and 50.0% 
of Senate candidates who outspent their opponents won.122  And, 
when outside spending is factored in, only 48% of House candidates 
and 19% of Senate candidates with a total spending edge won their 
2012 races.123 
How do we explain these numbers?  First, it is fairly clear that 
campaign spending, like many other types of spending, has 
diminishing returns.124  In the minority of close races where spending 
by candidates and outside groups skyrockets, it is less likely that the 
marginal dollar that puts one candidate over the top will lead to 
victory. 
Further, outside spending does not appear to be as clearly 
correlated with victory as spending by the actual candidate.125  One 
reason for this is related to the concept of diminishing returns 
outlined above.  Outside spending tends to be concentrated in a 
narrow set of highly competitive races where the overall amount of 
money spent is extremely high.126  Next, it may be that outside 
spending organizations are simply not as effective at helping favored 
candidates win as candidates themselves.  This could be because they 
tend to be national in scope and, therefore, are less familiar with 
local voters and the best messaging or strategy needed to win.  It 
could be because many outside spending groups have goals beyond 
(and sometimes above) electing a particular candidate and fealty to 
these goals may undermine their electoral success (for example, if 
the particular issue a group is focused on is not the best winning issue 
for its preferred candidate).  Some have even suggested that outside 
groups are more concerned with expression and pleasing their 
 
 121  See, e.g., The Wealth Primary, supra note 82. 
 122  Bowie & Lioz, supra note 78, at 18. 
 123  Id. 
 124  See Gary C. Jacobson, The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New 
Evidence for Old Arguments, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI  2, 334–62, 337 (1990) (“[I]t is clear that 
linear models of campaign spending effects are inadequate because diminishing 
returns must apply to campaign spending.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 125  The numbers cited in this section strongly suggest this conclusion. 
 126  Lee Drutman, Outside Money in the Senate: One Map, Four Graphs, and 
Seven Takeaways, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION Oct. 24, 2012, 
http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2012/10/24/outside-money-in-the-senate/ 
(“Half of the outside money is in just four races.”). 
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donors than actually winning campaigns.127 
But, even in these cases, the logical conclusion is certainly not 
that money is not important.  After all, a candidate needs to raise a 
huge amount (and/or have a huge amount spent on his or her 
behalf) to get into and, then remain, in the game.128  If a candidate 
runs for U.S. Senate, is outspent $17 million to $15 million but still 
wins, her next thought is hardly, “oh, well I guess I don’t have to 
worry about raising so much money next time because it clearly 
didn’t matter.” 
This leads to another important point: regardless of the actual 
influence of money on election outcomes, money will continue to 
matter as long as all the key players in the system act as if it matters—
and there is little doubt that they do.  When current Chicago Mayor 
and former White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emmanuel was in 
Congress and working to engineer a Democratic takeover of the 
House of Representatives in 2006, he summed up the prevailing view 
in a candid speech to campaign staff: “The first third of your 
campaign is money, money, money.  The second third is money, 
money, money.  And the last third is votes, press, and money.”129  It is 
common knowledge that fundraising prowess or potential (or the 
ability to self-finance) is a primary factor considered by party leaders 
responsible for candidate recruitment.130  Candidates’ and elected 
officials’ own behavior demonstrates conclusively that they consider 
amassing sufficient financial resources to be a sin qua non of a 
successful campaign.131 
 
 127  See, e.g., UP with Steve Kornacki (MSNBC television broadcast May 19, 2013) 
(interview with Kim Barker), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/52109133/ns/msnbc-
rachel_maddow_show/t/steve-kornacki-sunday-may-th/#.UiNIqrzlxz0.  (“And some 
of the ads just don’t work at all.  Like they don’t connect with the voters, they don’t 
have any sort of impact.  And the reason they don’t have any sort of impact is 
because they were written to satisfy the donor, and what the donor wanted to say is I 
hate this, I hate this person for doing it, and I want everybody to know it . . . they 
have no influence.”). 
 128  See supra Part III.C. 
 129  Lee Drutman, Why Money Still Matters, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION BLOG (Nov. 15, 
2012 10:34 AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2012/11/15/why-money-still-
matters/ (quoting NAFTALI BENDAVID, THE THUMPIN 157 (2008)).  
 130  See, e.g., Millionaire Candidates, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/millionaires.php (visited Sept. 1, 2013, 
10:58 AM) (“[M]ore and more candidates are jumping into politics using their 
personal fortune. . . .”). 
 131  See, e.g., Tracey Jan, For Freshmen in Congress, Focus is on Raising Money, THE 
BOSTON GLOBE May 12, 2013 (“The newcomers were told to devote at least four 
hours each day to the tedious task of raising money—so-called dialing for dollars—so 
they could build a war chest and defend their seats, according to those present. 
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Furthermore, the very makeup of Congress itself provides some 
evidence that it helps to be wealthy (and presumably have wealthy 
friends) if one wants to serve in the Senate or the “people’s House.”  
The U.S. Congress is a virtual millionaire’s club, with more than 48% 
its members having a net worth of more than $1 million.132  The 
median wealth of U.S. senators is $2.5 million.133  This compares with 
a population of constituents in which just 4.3% were millionaires134 
and median household net worth was $68,828 in 2011.135 
Not surprisingly, there is a corresponding lack of working-class 
citizens in our national legislature, as noted above and documented 
by Duke University’s Nicholas Carnes.136  In addition to reporting the 
numbers—just 2% of representatives came from working class 
backgrounds over a 100-year period137—Carnes finds evidence that 
the class makeup of Congress influences policy outcomes.  In a 2012 
study of roll call votes in the U.S. House of Representatives, he 
reports that: 
Occupational differences in roll-call voting were striking.  
Representatives who entered politics after careers in profit-
oriented professions—farm owners, businesspeople, and 
other private-sector professionals—voted substantially more 
conservatively than other members.  Representatives from 
working-class jobs, on the other hand, voted more liberally.  
And representatives who last worked as politicians and 
service-based professionals (the not-for-profit professions) 
 
That’s twice as much time as party leaders expect them to dedicate to committee 
hearings and floor votes, or meetings with constituents.”), 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2013/05/11/freshman-lawmakers-are-
introduced-permanent-hunt-for-campaign-
money/YQMMMoqCNxGKh2h0tOIF9H/story.html. 
 132  Millionaire Freshman Make Congress Even Wealthier, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE 
POLITICS Jan. 16, 2013, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/01/new-congress-
new-and-more-wealth.html. 
 133  Id. 
 134  Emily Jane Fox, Number of Millionaires See a Decline in Wealth, CNN MONEY June 
4, 2012, http://money.cnn.com/2012/06/01/news/economy/american-
millionaires/index.htm. 
 135  Alfred Gottschalck, Marina Vornovytskyy & Adam Smith, Household Wealth in 
the U.S.: 2000 to 2011, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 21, 2013), 
http://www.census.gov/people/wealth/files/Wealth%20Highlights%202011.pdf. 
 136  Nicholas Carnes, Does the Numerical Underrepresentation of the Working Class in 
Congress Matter?, 37 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5, 6–7 (2012) (looking at data from 1901 to 1996 
and showing that working-class people “made up between 50% and 60% of the 
nation during the last hundred years but . . . constituted 2% or less of the legislators 
who served in each Congress during that time.”). 
 137  Id. at 6. 
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and lawyers (the professional, ambiguous category) fell in 
between.138 
One more piece of evidence is worth mentioning.  The “political 
1% of the 1%” Drutman identified is so influential that “[n]ot a 
single member of the House or Senate elected last year won without 
financial assistance from this group. Money from the nation’s 31,385 
biggest givers found its way into the coffers of every successful 
congressional candidate.  And 84% of those elected in 2012 took 
more money from these 1% of the 1% donors than they did from all 
of their small donors (individuals who gave $200 or less) 
combined.”139  It appears that if one wishes to get elected to federal 
office, it helps to raise money from wealthy donors. 
D.  The Vicious Cycle Complete 
What emerges is a clear picture of a classic vicious cycle.  
Wealthy donors capturing control of the political system leads to 
economic policies that benefit the already-rich.  This concentrates 
income at the top, facilitating further political capture.140  Both 
political equality and economic opportunity are compromised, and a 
nation that was once the international symbol of equal opportunity 
regardless of station has become both less equal and less mobile 
economically. 
IV. HOW THE SUPREME COURT HELPED IGNITE THE VICIOUS CYCLE, 
AND HOW A NEW JURISPRUDENCE CAN HELP REVERSE IT141 
A. Capitalism and Democracy 
The story outlined above is, fundamentally, about the uneasy 
 
 138  Id. at 15.  
 139  Drutman, supra note 111. 
 140  GILENS, supra note 19, at 252 (“[R]ich Americans tend to support the 
economic policies from which they have so greatly benefited.  This raises the 
disturbing prospect of a vicious cycle in which growing economic and political 
inequality are mutually reinforcing.”). 
 141  Many of the ideas contained in this section have been previously published in 
Adam Lioz & Liz Kennedy, Democracy at Stake: Political Equality in the Super PAC Era, 39 
HUMAN RTS. MAG. 18 (2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications
/human_rights_magazine_home/2012_vol_39_/winter_2012_-
_vote/democracy_at_stakepoliticalequalityinthesuperpacera.html; see also Adam Lioz, 
Why Corporations Shouldn’t Play in Elections, HUFFINGTON POST Sept. 12, 2009, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-lioz 
/why-corporations-shouldnt_b_283703.html.  I first developed these ideas in a 2006 
unpublished paper written to satisfy the writing requirements at Yale Law School.  
This paper is available upon request. 
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relationship between the representative democracy the founders 
designed and the (moderated) capitalism that has evolved to 
complement it.  Calibrating this relationship correctly is absolutely 
essential for ensuring the legitimacy of the relationships within each 
system or sphere.  This is in part because we hold different values 
dear in each aspect of our public lives.  Critically, the value of equality 
is much more central to our political and constitutional tradition 
than our economic order. 
At the time of ratification, our Constitution and Bill of Rights 
were primarily concerned with freedom, specifically with protecting 
citizens from an unaccountable and oppressive central government.142  
Yet, the Declaration of Independence’s invocation that “all men are 
created equal” showed that notions of basic equality (as understood 
at the time) informed our nation’s very birth.143  From there, one can 
view American history as a slow, arduous struggle to elevate political 
equality to its rightful place on par with liberty as a fundamental 
political and constitutional value. 
The Civil War and the Reconstruction Amendments changed 
the focus of the Constitution, giving a new and strident voice to 
equality concerns.144  The Nineteenth Amendment expanded the 
franchise to women, affirming their equal status as citizens.145  The 
one person, one vote cases146 embraced political equality as a 
fundamental right and necessity in the United States; and the poll 
tax,147 property requirement,148 and candidate filing fee149 cases 
confirmed that this equality was not to be denied on account of 
financial resources, or lack thereof.  The Voting Rights Act, 
considered by many as the crown jewel of the Civil Rights 
 
 142  See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION (2008). 
 143  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776), available at 
http://www.law.indiana.edu/uslawdocs/declaration.html. 
 144  In his influential text We the People: Foundations, Bruce Ackerman argues that 
this “constitutional moment” transformed our Constitution fundamentally.  BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 211 (1991); see also AMAR, supra note 142, at 
299. 
 145  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth 
Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 946 (2002), 
available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
 =2116&context=fss_papers. 
 146  See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 
(1964). 
 147  See generally Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 148  See generally Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
 149  See generally Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972). 
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Movement,150 sought to make the promise of political equality real by 
offering federal protections against state and local efforts to restrict 
the franchise on account of race.151 
This trajectory has led several noted legal and constitutional 
scholars to recognize that equality “is one of the center beams of the 
legal order;”152 “[p]olitical equality is the cornerstone of American 
democracy;”153 “the goal of political equality is time-honored in the 
American constitutional tradition;”154 and “[t]he history of American 
democracy is a halting journey toward political equality.”155 
Critically, the value of equality is not found exclusively in the 
Reconstruction Amendments, to be balanced or pitted against the 
First Amendment, but rather is an essential part of the meaning of 
the First Amendment itself.  Professor Kenneth Karst borrows 
language from the famous First Amendment case New York Times v. 
Sullivan to make the point that “[t]he principle of equality, when 
understood to mean equal liberty, is not just a peripheral support for 
the freedom of expression, but rather part of the ‘central meaning of 
the First Amendment.’”156  Karst argues further that “the first 
amendment demands an even greater degree of equality in the 
electoral process than does the equal protection clause,”157 and 
Professor David Cole claims that “the First Amendment creates a kind 
of equal protection guarantee for speakers and ideas.”158  Finally, 
Professor and Judge J. Skelly Wright notes that “the ideals of political 
equality and individual participation are essential to a proper 
understanding of the first amendment.”159 
This scholarly view tracks well with common understanding.  
 
 150  See, e.g., Heather Gerken, Goodbye to the Crown Jewel of the Civil Rights Movement, 
SLATE June 25, 2013, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics
/jurisprudence/2013/06/supreme_court_and_the_voting_rights_act_goodbye_to_se
ction_5.html. 
 151  42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973aa-6 (struck in part by Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 
2612 (2013). 
 152  OWEN FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 11 (1998). 
 153  J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an 
Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 625 (1982). 
 154  Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, supra note 57, at 1399. 
 155  Burt Neuborne, Soft Landings, in IF BUCKLEY FELL: A FIRST AMENDMENT 
BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATING MONEY IN POLITICS 179 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz ed., 2000). 
 156  Kenneth Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 20, 21 (1975) (internal citation omitted). 
 157  Id. at 53. 
 158  David Cole, First Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Faire in Campaign 
Finance, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 236, 243 (1991). 
 159  Wright, supra note 153, at 609.  
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Regardless of partisan affiliation or economic circumstance, the vast 
majority of Americans agree that it is critical that we all come to the 
political table as equals.160  Past restrictions on political participation 
based upon wealth, property ownership, race, gender, and other 
factors have given way to a nearly universal belief that representative 
democracy requires all citizens to have a substantially equal voice in 
making the decisions that affect their lives.  Put simply, the principle 
of “one person, one vote”161 is foundational and essentially universally 
accepted in American democracy.162 
By contrast, equality is a much more contested value in the 
economic sphere.163  This is because most of us recognize 
countervailing values such as incentives and efficiency, albeit to 
varying degrees; and even when we agree on a set of goals (such as 
widely shared prosperity), many have different empirical 
understandings about how to achieve them.164  Hence, our views 
about how to divide the economic pie are much more likely to break 
down along partisan or ideological lines.  All else being equal, self-
described conservatives are typically comfortable with a wider income 
or wealth gap than are self-described progressives.  Regardless, few (if 
any) prominent voices argue for complete outcome equality, or even 
the types of aggressive measures that would provide pure equality of 
opportunity.  These policy prescriptions, such as completely 
forbidding the transfer of wealth from one generation to the next, 
mandating equal (or remedial) per-pupil educational expenditures 
nationwide, or even outlawing private secondary education entirely, 
 
 160  This point is apparently so self-evident that it is difficult to find polling on this 
precise question; but, it is commonly asserted.  See, e.g., David Callahan & J. Mijin 
Cha, supra note 24, at 1. 
 161  See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 162  The application of the principle, of course, is often a subject of vigorous 
dispute.  But stakeholders generally argue how to most effectively implement the 
true meaning of the principle, not that the principle itself should be replaced or 
lacks moral weight.  See, e.g., Justin Levitt, All About Redistricting, LOYOLA LAW SCHOOL 
(citing different federal and state rules for determining equal population for 
redistricting purposes), available at redistricting.lls.edu; Joshua M. Rosenberg, 
Defining Population for One Person, one Vote, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 709 (2009) (discussing 
whether the total population or number of voters in a jurisdiction should be 
equalized). 
 163  See, e.g., Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, The Upside of Income Inequality, THE 
AMERICAN (May/June 2007), available at 
http://www.american.com/archive/2007/may-june-magazine-contents/the-upside-
of-income-inequality. 
 164  Well-meaning economists, for example, disagree about the impact on 
economic growth and income distribution of tax cuts, government spending, 
monetary policy, and more. 
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remain largely outside the scope of mainstream American political 
discourse.165 
In sum, our twin commitments to democracy and capitalism 
leave most Americans with the general sense that every citizen has an 
equal right to participate in political life, but not necessarily the right 
to possess an equal number of dollars or amount of property.  The 
challenge occurs because although we hold different principles dear 
in these two spheres, they are not completely independent; inevitably 
they must interact.  Without proper protections, those who are 
successful (or simply lucky) in the economic sphere can translate 
their economic might directly into political power.166  Inequalities in 
the economic sphere that are perhaps legitimate become 
unwarranted disparities in the political sphere.  Ultimately, in order 
to protect the integrity of the values we hold dear and the legitimacy 
of the relationships that serve (or undermine) these values in each 
sphere, democracy must write the rules for capitalism, not the other 
way around. 
In addition to being guided by different principles, the political 
and economic arenas serve fundamentally different purposes.  
Unfettered market capitalism responds to only one value: more.  The 
market is best at producing more goods, but not necessarily effective 
at producing human happiness.  This is because human happiness is 
based not just on material possessions, but also on countervailing 
values such as community, reciprocity, ecology, etc.167  The political 
arena is the proper place to assert these countervailing values, but the 
capture of the political arena by economic interests threatens to leave 
these values chronically underserved. 
We often see evidence of this with the capture of government 
agencies by the industries they regulate.  State departments of 
environmental protection have been infamous in their pliancy 
 
 165  That some of these measures may be unconstitutional is beside the point.  If 
pure economic equality were a bedrock American value, we would expect to see 
these measures at least command some space within the public debate over 
economic policy. 
 166  Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 86, at 1162 (“In market societies where wealth is 
unevenly distributed yet crucial to the processes of election and governance, the 
inegalitarian logic of the economy undermines the egalitarian logic of one person, 
one vote democracy.”). 
 167  In fact, at least one study suggests that beyond a threshold that provides for 
security and basic needs, wealth is not strongly correlated with happiness.  See Daniel 
Kahneman & Angus Deaton, High Income Improves Evaluation of Life but not 
Emotional Well-Being , PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S. (Aug. 4, 
2010), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/107/38/16489. 
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towards polluters;168 the Securities and Exchange Commission has 
been run by Wall Street insiders;169 the Food and Drug Administration 
has allowed questionable drugs into the marketplace under pressure 
from the pharmaceutical industry;170 and the Minerals Management 
Service was reorganized after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill 
exposed its cozy ties to the oil industry.171  Several factors contribute 
to this “regulatory capture,” including the revolving door of 
employment in industry and the agencies that regulate them,172 
intense industry lobbying,173 and the desire of top-level political 
appointees to please executives in these industries who are 
responsible for a significant proportion of their bosses’ campaign 
cash through individual and PAC contributions.174 
A lack of prophylactic controls that prevent economic relations 
from shaping political institutions also threatens our ability to make 
sound decisions as a society.  When ideas gain currency not from 
their inherent appeal, but due to the brute force with which they are 
advocated, the marketplace of ideas is distorted.175  Our collective 
 
 168  See, e.g., Lee Fang, New ALEC Documents Show Regulatory Capture in Action, THE 
NATION Dec. 19, 2012, http://www.thenation.com/blog/171852/new-alec-
documents-show-regulatory-capture-action#axzz2deycqgSx. 
 169  See, e.g., Dina ElBoghdady, Watchdog Report Raises Concerns about SEC’s Revolving 
Door, WASH. POST Feb. 11, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-02-
11/business/37034389_1_clients-pogo-report-sec-job. 
 170  See, e.g., Alicia Mundy, FDA Still Too Chummy with Pharmaceutical Industry, Critics 
Say, THE SEATTLE TIMES Nov. 22, 2007, 
http://seattletimes.com/html/health/2004029053_fenphen22m.html. 
 171  Juliet Eilperin & Scott Higham, How the Minerals Management Services’ 
Partnership with Industry Led to Failure, WASH. POST Aug. 24, 2010, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/08/24/AR2010082406754.html?sid=ST2010082404823. 
 172  More than 70% of the lobbyists employed by the securities and investment 
industry have previously worked in government according to the Center for 
Responsive Politics.  Revolving Door: Top Industries, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/revolving/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2013). 
 173  The pharmaceutical and health products industry spent $236 million on 
lobbying in 2012 according to the Center for Responsive Politics.  
Pharmaceuticals/Health Products, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/01/lobbying-expenditures-slump-in-
2011.html(last visited Sept. 1, 2013). 
 174  Individuals and PACs associated with the finance, insurance, and real estate 
industries contributed $664 million to federal campaigns in the 2012 cycle according 
to the Center for Responsive Politics.  Interest Groups, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2013). 
 175  Spending money to promote an idea can both help develop the best 
arguments in favor of the idea and help amplify the idea such that people are 
exposed to it again and again in various forms.  By “brute force” I mostly mean the 
latter, although the concept can apply to the former as well. 
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choices are unfairly, and inefficiently, skewed.  Professor David Cole 
echoes this basic point: 
Free market capitalism threatens the free marketplace of 
ideas by giving certain voices inordinate influence, not 
because of the power of their ideas, but because of the 
volume they can generate for their voices with dollars 
earned through commercial activities.  Because even “free 
speech” costs money, those who succeed in the economic 
marketplace are able to purchase far more speech 
opportunities than those who do not.  Absent government 
intervention of some kind, the marketplace of ideas, and in 
turn the election of our representatives, threatens to go to 
the highest bidder.  The threat posed by concentrated 
wealth is not merely the aberration of a bribed official, but 
the structural threat of a monopolized marketplace of 
ideas.176 
Finally, and most importantly, the bleeding of economic logic 
into political space threatens the very legitimacy of democratic 
decision-making, which, in turn, threatens the moral legitimacy of 
economic relations—completing a vicious cycle that echoes the one 
described above.   
Professor Edward B. Foley points out that all major modern 
theories of distributive justice (egalitarianism, libertarianism, 
utilitarianism, etc.) accept what he calls the “principal of intrinsic 
equality,” the notion that “the interests of all citizens must count 
equally for the purposes of distributive justice.”177  Loosely translated, 
this means that Abby’s “utils” (or units of value) cannot be worth 
more than Bob’s.  If each have five “utils,” society as a whole will not 
be made better off by giving Abby one of Bob’s “utils” because she is 
in some way inherently more valuable than he is (as, for example, a 
monarch was no doubt once thought to be).  Because everything 
beyond this one basic principle is in legitimate dispute, it is critical 
that society adopts a collective decision-making procedure that is 
consistent with this core principle, yet does not systemically replicate 
any particular distribution of resources that happens to represent the 
status quo.  Ultimately, Foley writes, “the very indeterminacy of 
distributive justice requires the fairness of the existing distribution of 
wealth to be determined by an electoral process that is structurally 
immunized from any distorting effects caused by the existing 
 
 176  Cole, supra note 158, at 237.   
 177  Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign 
Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1215 (1994).  
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distribution.”178 
Some scholars assert that allowing the wealthy to amplify their 
speech as much as will satisfy their need to feel heard is necessary to 
serve core First Amendment values by respecting speaker 
autonomy.179  But, others, such as Julian Eule, Owen Fiss, and Cass 
Sunstein, argue that the type of undue influence over public 
discourse facilitated by unchecked transference of economic wealth 
into the political sphere represents a fundamental threat to citizen 
autonomy.  Sunstein notes that “[t]he notion of autonomy should 
refer . . . to decisions reached with a full and vivid awareness of 
available opportunities, with reference to all relevant information, 
and without illegitimate or excessive constraints on the process of 
preference formation” and that individual attitudes are best 
“regarded as nonautonomous insofar as they are reflexively adaptive 
to unjust background conditions.”180 
Unless we are prepared to structure a wholly egalitarian 
economy, we cannot allow a particular current economic distribution 
to set the terms for our political deliberations.  To safeguard the 
legitimacy of both our democracy and the particular brand of 
moderated capitalism we currently employ, political equality must be 
our north star—the guiding principle around which we structure our 
society. 
B. Wealth and Politics 
This discussion of the relationship between capitalism and 
democracy shows clearly why for-profit corporations should not be 
permitted to spend treasury funds on electoral activities.  As 
economic actors chartered by the people to produce wealth, their 
political participation necessarily contributes to the vicious cycle 
described above.181  The fact that these artificial entities enjoy state-
 
 178  Id. at 1230. 
 179  Robert Post, Meiklejohns Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public 
Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1129–30 (1993).  Note that Post applies this 
notion only to the sphere of public discourse, which he distinguishes from the 
narrower sphere of electoral decision-making.  Robert Post, Dean and Sol & Lillian 
Goldman Professor of Law, Yale Law School, Representative Democracy: The 
Constitutional Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN 
VALUES (May 1-3, 2013). 
 180  Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 11, 21 (1991). 
 181  There are other important reasons why corporate political speech is different 
in character than that of natural persons.  Notably, one would hope that when 
engaging in political speech, citizens of a polity would consider and advocate what 
they perceive to be in the public interest, not just what is in their narrow pecuniary 
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conferred advantages that assist in the aggregation of wealth 
exacerbates the problem.182 
But, this logic can also apply to private personal wealth.  
Consider a law-firm partner or small-business owner who makes 
millions of dollars through a private partnership, a hedge-fund 
manager who earns billions in management fees that ultimately 
accrue to his private bank account, or a corporate executive who 
earns millions in salary and benefits and then still millions more by 
selling shares of the corporation’s stock granted as part of her 
compensation package.  If these individuals spend large amounts of 
their private capital to influence public decisions in our democracy, 
does this somehow cease to threaten our core democratic values or 
no longer contribute to the vicious cycle outlined above simply 
because they spend as individuals rather than through the corporate 
form? 
Regardless of the form they take, as Sunstein points out, “there is 
no good reason to allow disparities in wealth to be translated into 
disparities in political power.  A well-functioning democracy 
distinguishes between market processes of purchase and sale on the 
one hand and political processes of voting and reason-giving on the 
other.”183 
Simply put, to ensure the legitimacy of both our political and 
economic relations, democracy must write the rules for capitalism, 
not the other way around.  Robust rules regulating the use of money 
in politics are the best means we have to accomplish this end—the 
best protection against the direct translation of economic might into 
political power.  These rules should certainly prohibit corporations 
from spending treasury funds to influence elections.  They should 
also prevent millionaires and billionaires from drowning out the 
voices of non-wealthy citizens by spending excessive sums to support 
their favored candidates, or attempting to buy elected office outright 
for themselves.  And, they should ensure that a tiny minority of 
 
interest.  Publicly traded for-profit corporations, on the other hand, are bound by 
fiduciary duty to shareholders to consider only the profit motive when taking and 
advocating public positions.  Many scholars also argue persuasively that for-profit 
corporations lack free speech and other constitutional rights that would grant them 
entry into the domain of public discourse.  This discussion is largely beyond the 
scope of this article, but for a full discussion see JEFFREY D. CLEMENTS, CORPORATIONS 
ARE NOT PEOPLE: WHY THEY HAVE MORE RIGHTS THAN YOU DO AND WHAT YOU CAN DO 
ABOUT IT (2012). 
 182  See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990). 
 183  Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, supra note 57, at 1390. 
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wealthy donors cannot determine who runs for office by making 
contributions to campaigns that are significantly larger than those 
average-earning citizens can afford to make. 
C. The Role of the Supreme Court  
1.  The People In the Lead 
The American people have long been concerned with the 
troubling relationship between economic might and political power.  
The cornerstone reforms of the Progressive Era were attempts to 
right the balance between politics and economics, a balance that had 
been badly skewed by the emergence of the great trusts.  Theodore 
Roosevelt asserted in 1910 that “[t]he citizens of the United States 
must effectively control the mighty commercial forces which they 
themselves have called into being,”184  another way of saying that 
democracy must write the rules for capitalism.  He continued by 
noting that “[t]here can be no effective control of corporations while 
their political activity remains.”185 
The Progressive Era produced important reforms intended to 
curb the political power of aggregated wealth.186  But the battle to 
empower ordinary citizens over wealthy interests did not end there.  
In the 1970s, Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act, 
then strengthened it in response to the Watergate scandal.187  In 
recent decades numerous states and localities have passed laws to 
curb the influence of big money on our democracy and raise the 
voices of non-wealthy citizens—from strict contribution limits188 and 
caps on candidate spending189 to public financing programs190 and 
bans on corporate spending on candidate and ballot initiative 
campaigns.191  Several of these programs were passed by the people 
 
 184  Theodore Roosevelt, Speech in Osawatomie, Kansas: The New Nationalism 
(Aug. 31, 1910), available at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document
/new-nationalism-speech/. 
 185  Id. 
 186  The Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907).  
 187  The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”) Pub. L. 92-225, 86 Stat. 
3 (1972).   
 188  MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-216 (2009), as adjusted by MONT. ADMIN. R. 44.10.338 
(2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805 (2005). 
 189  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805a (2005). 
 190  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16–940 (1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-
700, et seq. (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A §§ 1121-28 (2011); VT. STAT. 
ANN., tit. 17 §§ 2803, 2811, 2821–23, 2831–32, 2851–56 (2011). 
 191  See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII, §§ 3(4), 6(2); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
LIOZ (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2013  2:20 PM 
2013] BREAKING THE VICIOUS CYCLE 1265 
 
directly through ballot initiatives.192  And, support among the public 
for strict campaign finance laws public remains sky-high.193 
2.  The Supreme Court Drags Behind 
Unfortunately, in the battle to empower the vast majority of 
ordinary citizens over a tiny minority of wealthy donors, advocates 
have been severely confined by the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence; unable to mount a full-throated defense of laws that 
can effectively constrain the dominance of wealth in politics.  This is 
because for decades, rather than carefully considering both core 
American values of liberty and equality and grappling directly with 
the challenges outlined above, the Supreme Court has embraced a 
simplistic and reflexively individualistic and libertarian view of the 
Constitution.  The justices have failed to recognize our collective 
interest in promoting political equality as a legitimate and compelling 
governmental interest and, more recently, even declared that these 
efforts are specifically forbidden by the First Amendment.194  And, 
they have failed to give adequate consideration to any number of 
other rationales that can promote effective representation by 
safeguarding a government of, by, and for the people.195 
Rather, the Supreme Court has recognized only one 
governmental interest weighty enough to limit campaign money, and 
then narrowed the scope of that one interest over the years.  This has 
been anti-regulatory justices’ primary mechanism for deeming 
forbidden many reasonable restrictions on money in politics.  And, it 
has meant that as reform advocates have approached the proverbial 
bench to defend democratically-enacted campaign finance laws, they 
have then been forced to leave many of their very best arguments 
behind. 
In the seminal 1976 campaign finance case Buckley v. Valeo,196 the 
 
169.254(1) (West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-227(1) (2003); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. P.S. § 3253(a) (West 2006). 
 192  See, e.g., Arizona Clean Elections, Proposition 200 (1998); Maine Campaign 
Finance Initiative, Question 3 (1996). 
 193  Liz Kennedy, Citizens Actually United: The Overwhelming, Bi-Partisan Opposition to 
Corporate Political Spending And Support for Achievable Reforms, DEMOS Oct. 25, 2012, 
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/CitizensActuallyUnited_Cor
poratePoliticalSpending.pdf. 
 194  See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 
(2011). 
 195  Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), available at 
http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/gettysburg.htm. 
 196  424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
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Court addressed post-Watergate amendments to the Federal Election 
Campaign Act (FECA), which included limits on contributions to 
candidates for federal office, limits on campaign spending by these 
candidates, and limits on “independent” spending by individuals or 
entities supporting or opposing a specific candidate.197  The Court 
held that spending money on politics was a form of direct speech and 
therefore any restrictions on such spending were subject to strict 
scrutiny; and that making financial contributions to candidates or 
causes is a form of attenuated speech, still deserving of First 
Amendment protections, but subject to a slightly lower standard of 
scrutiny.198  Ultimately, the Court upheld limits on contributions to 
candidates and political action committees and struck down limits on 
direct expenditures both by candidates and other persons or 
groups.199 
But, most relevant for the purposes of this Article, the Buckley 
Court recognized only one government interest in limiting campaign 
money that it deemed sufficiently weighty to balance against what it 
saw as an important restriction of liberty: preventing corruption or its 
appearance.200  While not completely clear, the Court’s definition of 
corruption appeared to be fairly narrow, focusing on the quid pro 
quo exchange of money for votes or other official action.201  Further, 
 
 197  The Federal Election Campaign Act 1974 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 
88 Stat. 1263, amending Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 
86 Stat. 3. 
 198  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19–20 (“The expenditure limitations contained in the Act 
represent substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and 
diversity of political speech. . . .  By contrast with a limitation upon expenditures for 
political expression, a limitation upon the amount that any one person or group may 
contribute to a candidate or political committee entails only a marginal restriction 
upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.”). 
 199  The Buckley Court’s per curium opinion upheld contribution limits and public 
financing but struck limits on candidate spending and independent expenditures.  
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 143–44. 
 200  The government asserted two other interests—equalizing political voice and 
maintaining an accessible process in the face of increasing campaign costs.  The 
Court did not assess these in the context of contribution limits.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 
26 (“It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act’s primary purpose to limit the actuality 
and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions 
in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000 contribution 
limitation.”).  But, it considered and rejected both interests in the context of 
expenditure limits.  Id. at 48–50 (see infra text accompanying note 202); Id. at 54 
(“The ancillary interest in equalizing the relative financial resources of candidates 
competing for elective office . . . is clearly not sufficient to justify the provision’s 
infringement of fundamental First Amendment rights.”). 
 201  Id. at 26–27 (“To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a 
political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our 
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the Buckley Court specifically rejected a compelling interest in 
promoting political equality by leveling the playing field between 
wealthy donors and average citizens.  In what may be the single most 
damaging sentence in the entire canon of campaign finance law, the 
Buckley Court wrote that “the concept that government may restrict 
the speech of some . . . in order to enhance the relative voice of 
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment . . . .”202 
While wrongheaded in its rejection of an equality interest, 
Buckley nevertheless left the door open to other rationales beyond 
quid pro quo corruption, and in the ensuing years the justices 
grappled with various possibilities.  The Court recognized what is 
arguably a species of the equality argument in a case called Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce;203 entertained an expansive, somewhat 
systemic view of corruption in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri PAC;204 and 
affirmed this expansive view in McConnell v. Federal Election 
Commission.205  In a concurring opinion in Nixon, Justice Stevens 
articulated his view that “[m]oney is property; it is not speech,” 
urging a reexamination of Buckley’s foundational assumptions.206 
But, the Roberts Court has put a decisive end to any remnant 
flexibility.  First in 2006’s Randall v. Sorrell,207 then in Davis v. Federal 
Election Commission,208 and culminating in Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission,209 the Court majority again explicitly rejected 
rationales beyond corruption (overturning Austin) and significantly 
narrowed the scope of the anti-corruption interest, asserting that 
“ingratiation and access . . . are not corruption.”210 
The Court’s exclusive reliance on corruption is troubling for two 
key reasons.  First, it is wholly inadequate to address the profound 
interests at stake in regulating the role of money in politics because it 
 
system of representative democracy is undermined.”).  
 202  Id. at 48–49.  
 203  494 U.S. 652, 659–61 (1990). 
 204  528 U.S. 377, 389–90 (2000). 
 205  540 U.S. 93, 143–54 (2003). 
 206  528 U.S. at 398 (Stevens, J., concurring).  My views of the relationship between 
money and speech are somewhat beyond the scope of this article; but I do not 
subscribe to the categorical view that money should always be conceived of as 
property with no speech element. 
 207  548 U.S. 230 (2006). 
 208  554 U.S. 724 (2008). 
 209  558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 210  Id. at 360 (overturning McConnell in part).  The post-Citizens United case Ariz. 
Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett singled out the desire to level the 
playing field as being an impermissible government interest.  131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).  
LIOZ (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2013  2:20 PM 
1268 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1227 
 
completely misses the point of the vicious cycle story outlined above, 
and in so doing, actually mis-defines the problem of money in 
politics.  Second, it is not intellectually defensible because when 
closely scrutinized, concerns about quid pro quo corruption (the type 
that the Court currently recognizes as constitutionally momentous) 
break down into a deeper concern about inequality. 
The reality is that fighting corruption and its appearance is only 
one of the interests at stake in efforts to, as Justice Breyer has written, 
“democratize the influence that money can bring to bear upon the 
electoral process”211—and not even the most important one.  
Addressing the role of money in politics is not simply about good or 
clean governance.  Rather, it is about shifting fundamental power 
dynamics in American society to facilitate meaningful representation 
for all citizens.  The vicious cycle outlined in this Article is 
fundamentally about voice and power.  Promoting political equality is 
a key motivation behind the drive to curb the influence of wealthy 
donors and empower ordinary citizens. 
Judge Guido Calabresi addressed this point in an important 
2005 opinion: 
It seems to me that there are two principal values at play in 
the campaign finance debate.  One is the desire to let 
individuals express the intensity of their political feelings, 
and to do so in a very particular way—that is, through 
money in the form of either campaign expenditures or 
contributions. . . . 
The other value is the deeply felt desire not to have the 
wealthy be able to influence elections more than the poor.  
This value, however, has two distinct aspects.  The first is the 
generalized egalitarian desire not to advantage one group 
in society over another.  The second—which is inextricably 
linked to the “intensity of expression” value and hence 
partakes of its First Amendment attributes—is that, given 
the unequal distribution of wealth, money does not 
measure intensity of desire equally for rich and poor.  In 
other words, and crucially, a large contribution by a person 
of great means may influence an election enormously, and 
yet may represent a far lesser intensity of desire than a 
pittance given by a poor person. . . . 
The notion that intensity of desire is not well-measured by 
money in a society where money is not equally distributed 
 
 211  STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION 47 (2005). 
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has been, since Buckley, the huge elephant—and donkey—
in the living room in all discussions of campaign finance 
reform.  Buckley, by fiat, declared the state’s explicit 
recognition and amelioration of wealth distribution 
problems in the electoral marketplace to be an 
insufficiently compelling interest to pass constitutional 
muster.  And yet, I submit, it remains at least implicitly 
behind much campaign finance reform legislation.212 
The anti-corruption rationale, as interpreted by the Court, has 
always been inadequate to address this challenge.  Sheldon and 
Miriam Adelson gave nearly $92 million to Super PACs created in the 
wake of Citizens United.213  But, since Buckley, the Adelsons would have 
been able to spend that money directly to support the candidates of 
their choice.  Modern candidates occasionally spend tens of millions 
of dollars of their own money attempting to win public office.214  And, 
corporations and wealthy donors have long been permitted to spend 
unlimited sums to support or oppose ballot initiatives.215  All of these 
situations are troubling and violate the principle of one person, one 
vote; none involves quid pro quo corruption. 
3.  Quid Pro Quo Corruption is an Equality Concern 
Each legislator in a representative democracy embodies an 
inherent tension.  Is her role to lead the people or to follow?  Is she 
elected as a trustee, sent to the capitol to exercise her own 
independent and considered judgment when faced with moral and 
political issues?  Or, is she merely a delegate, sent to voice the will of 
her constituents and vote according to her understanding of their 
desires?216 
 
 212  Landell v. Sorrell, 406 F.3d 159, 160–62 (2d. Cir. 2005) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 213  Bowie & Lioz, supra note 78, at 10.  As noted above, this may not be evidence 
of any particularly intense desire for political participation since this figure 
represents a very small percentage of the Adelsons’ net worth—the equivalent of an 
average-earning family contributing less than $300. 
 214  See, e.g., Jennifer Lin & Tom Torcol, Corzine’s Wealth Paving Senate Campaign: 
The New Jersey Democrat Has Risen from Obscurity, Spending Prodigiously: $15 for Every 
Dollar By Florio, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER May 25, 2000, 
http://articles.philly.com/2000-05-25/news/25618243_1_jon-s-corzine-senate-race-
senate-candidate. 
 215  First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 216  Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
111, 120–21.  For an illuminating historical discussion of the tensions around 
representation, see also Robert Post, Representative Democracy: The Constitutional Theory 
of Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 179. 
LIOZ (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2013  2:20 PM 
1270 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1227 
 
If one believes in a pure trustee model, then any attempt to 
influence a legislator’s vote—including a promised or actual 
campaign contribution—is an unwelcome distortion.  As Professor 
David Strauss writes: 
On one view of the political process, most decisions made 
by our system are like the decisions of judges.  This view 
holds that there is a comprehensive conception of the 
public interest.  That is, decisions in general are to be made 
by consulting the public interest, and we can determine 
what the public interest is by engaging in some form of 
normative reasoning.217 
All indications, however, are that few citizens or academics hold 
to this strict view.  And, in fact, Strauss continues by lamenting that 
this approach “seems to leave no room for elections.”218  Most people 
in reality seem to feel there is nothing inherently wrong with 
attempting to influence legislators’ votes on public issues.  This 
happens all the time when people call or write their legislators, or 
stage protests and rallies.  Further, without realizing it, we embrace 
the corresponding belief that there is nothing inherently sinister 
about quid pro quo arrangements in representative democracy.  In 
fact this type of give-and-take lies at the heart of democratic politics.219 
In a process known as “logrolling,” legislators trade favors all of 
the time—that is, “you vote for my pet project and I’ll vote for yours,” 
or “you agree to fight the closing of the army base in my district and 
I’ll vote for you for party whip.”  This is in large part how legislative 
business is conducted in Washington, D.C. and in state capitols and 
city halls throughout the United States. 
Citizens and interest groups regularly engage in explicit and 
implicit quid pro quos with legislators as well—for votes.  AARP is an 
extremely powerful organization because it presumptively 
“represents” millions of older (and regular) voters.220  These are 
voters who are willing to collectively make demands on politicians 
 
 217  David Strauss, What is the Goal of Campaign Finance Reform?, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 141, 147. 
 218  Id. at 147. 
 219  For a similar version of the forthcoming argument, see Thomas Cmar, Toward 
a Small Donor Democracy: The Past and Future of Incentives for Small Political Contributions, 
U.S. PIRG EDUCATION FUND (2004), at 37, available at 
http://www.uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports
/Toward_A_Small_Donor_Democracy_USPIRG.pdf. 
 220  According to its website, AARP has more than 37 million members.  Who We 
Are, AARP.ORG, http://www.aarp.org/about-aarp/?intcmp=FTR-LINKS (last visited 
Sept. 1, 2013). 
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precisely by implying that those who turn a deaf ear risk paying the 
price on Election Day.  The League of Conservation Voters (LCV) 
puts out a scorecard ranking candidates according to their 
environmental records221 and endorses candidates—explicitly 
announcing to its membership and other concerned members of the 
public that they should vote for or against a candidate because of her 
votes on environmental issues.222  LCV lobbyists aggressively pursue a 
legislative agenda in Washington.  Although explicitly threatening 
politicians is rarely good lobbying strategy, on major priorities such as 
drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge or supporting the 
Keystone Pipeline, it is perfectly clear to politicians that the 
organization’s endorsement is staked on their positions.  The same is 
true of countless membership-based organizations across the country. 
None of this activity is considered suspect in a democracy, and 
our acceptance of bald attempts to influence legislators indicates that 
most of us accept the delegate model at least to a significant extent.  
So, why is the Supreme Court so concerned about financial quid pro 
quo arrangements?  After all, this is not money that goes directly into 
politicians’ pockets; bribery laws outlaw such explicit personal gain.  
Why is it perfectly acceptable for a citizen or a group of citizens to 
explicitly promise a politician their vote—or implicitly promise 
thousands or millions of votes—if she votes the “right” way on a 
favorite issue, but inherently problematic to promise a financial 
contribution to the same politician’s campaign for the exact same 
vote?223 
The answer to this question is almost certainly that what 
concerns us about the latter situation is not the quid pro quo 
arrangement at all, but a vague and unarticulated notion of equality.  
We are not bothered by citizens bargaining with their votes because 
everyone isat least in theory224accorded a vote on an equal basis, 
and thus everyone enjoys equal bargaining power.  This is not so with 
financial bargaining power.  It violates our basic sense of fairness to 
 
 221  Nat’l Envtl. Scorecard, LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS, 
http://scorecard.lcv.org/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2013). 
 222  2012 Endorsements, LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS, 
http://www.lcv.org/elections/endorsements/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2013). 
 223  Cain, supra note 216, at 116 (“According to some reformers, an official who 
takes a public action in exchange for contributions is guilty of bribery, but one who 
exchanges public actions for votes is not.  This makes no sense.  The personal benefit 
in both cases is holding office: money and votes are used to win elections, and as 
between the two, votes are more crucial than money.”). 
 224  Disparities in actual voting power, of course, persist between the affluent and 
the poor, whites and communities of color, older Americans and youth, etc. 
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bargain for legislative success with money because that game is not 
played on a level playing field due to unequal wealth distribution.  As 
Strauss writes, “[o]ne obvious problem with allowing candidates to be 
‘bought’ is that people with more wealth are, other things equal, in a 
better position to buy them.  Corruption of this kind, therefore, 
presents problems of inequality.”225 
Professor Daniel Hays Lowenstein, in a response to Strauss and 
Bruce Cain, works to rehabilitate the conceptual distinction between 
corruption and equality.226  To illustrate that corruption concerns are 
truly about inequality, Strauss constructs a thought experiment in 
which everyone has an equal ability to bribe politicians with 
campaign contributions.227  Lowenstein counters with an experiment 
of his own, in which a wealthy donor can give a $100,000 contribution 
to either a politician who supports the donor’s views or to a politician 
who will change his views for the donor’s money.228  The reader is 
assumed to view the former as a legitimate transaction, but consider 
the latter a horrifying example of money “corrupting” a politician. 
Lowenstein misses the fundamental point that it is this donor’s 
ability (financial, legal, etc.) to provide a contribution much larger 
than most people could afford which is the core of the problem, not 
the effect (or lack thereof) of the contribution on the person to 
whom she chooses to contribute.  Regardless of the influence on the 
recipient, this large contribution affords the donor an outsized 
influence on the political process—influence that is not 
representative of the public will.  In addition, it is only the fact that 
this donor is contributing substantially more than her fellow citizens 
that raises the prospect of undue influence.  After all, if everyone had 
an equal ability to contribute $100,000, her contribution would not 
buy her much and there would be no problem either way. 
Lowenstein also realizes that he must defend the distinction 
between “bribing” politicians with campaign contributions and with 
votes.  He offers no principled way to make this distinction, however, 
resting his case solely on the fact that “prevailing social norms 
unambiguously condemn the practice” of trading campaign money 
 
 225  Strauss, supra note 217, at 143; see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and 
Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 679 (1997) (“Thus, properly understood, 
the ‘corruption’ argument is really a variant on the problem of political equality: 
unequal outlays of political money create inequality in political representation.”).   
 226  Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Campaign Contributions and Corruption: Comments on 
Strauss and Cain, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163. 
 227  Strauss, supra note 217, at 143–44. 
 228  Lowenstein, supra note 226, at 168–73. 
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for legislative outcomes.229  Lowenstein posits, “[a]re there good 
reasons for disapproving and seeking to change the existent norm 
that regards the bartering of campaign contributions for legislative 
votes as corrupt?  I think not.”230 
In our current system, characterized by substantial economic 
inequality and legal contributions far larger than most Americans can 
afford to make, suspending this taboo would certainly make matters 
worse.  But, this way of thinking obscures the most important reason 
we care about the influence of money on politics, and there is real 
harm done by incorrectly defining the problem and hence distracting 
Americans—from judges to legislators to reform advocates—from 
true solutions.  Even if quid pro quo corruption were an 
independently legitimate concern, focusing on its effects proceeds 
from a flawed conception of the true impact of money on the 
American political process.  As noted above, focusing on the effect of 
money on politicians misses the forest for the trees.  It is much more 
helpful to consider the impact of money on elections—principally on 
who runs for political office in the U.S. and who wins elections.231  
This is true in large part because one could solve the corruption 
problem entirely (producing “clean” government in which every 
legislator votes her conscience) without substantially addressing 
concerns about voice, power, and political equality, whereas the 
reverse is not true.232 
4.  Money Buys Elections More Often Than it Buys 
Politicians 
While politicians may at times alter their votes or priorities in 
response to particular contributions, most politicians are probably 
not “corrupt” in this way most of the time.233  Even the most cynical 
 
 229  Id. at 189. 
 230  Id. at 190. 
 231  I have elaborated this point much more fully and forcefully in several reports 
for the U.S. PIRG Education Fund.  See generally Adam Lioz, The Role of Money in the 
2002 Congressional Elections, U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND, (2003), 
http://uspirgorg.live.pubintnet-
dev.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/Role_of_Money_2002_USPIRG.pdf; Dana Mason & 
Adam Lioz, U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND, Look Who’s Not Coming to Washington, (2005), 
http://www.uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/Look_Whos_Not_Coming_To_Was
hington_USPIRG.pdf.). 
 232  This is both because of the theoretical discussion above and because policies 
(such as spending limits and low contribution limits) that promote political equality 
also effectively minimize demand or opportunities for quid pro quo corruption.   
 233  Various studies have attempted to connect financial contributions with votes, 
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critics of the American legislative process would concede that the 
majority of legislation is likely produced by politicians pursuing 
policies that at minimum are not in conflict with their own 
convictions—and often are critical expressions of these convictions.  
To the extent that votes are being shifted or (more likely) issues are 
being elevated or put on the back burner because of the role of 
money, this is more often because of legislators’ general calculations 
about how such actions will affect their ability to raise funds than 
because of a specific quid pro quo transaction. 
The more deeply systemic account of the role of money in 
politics I have articulated above234 stresses that the most important 
impact of money is deciding who gets into positions of power and 
authority in the first place.  If special interests or wealthy individuals 
can ensure that their friends, associates, colleagues, or neighbors are 
elected to Congress, there will be comparatively little need to bribe 
them once in office.  After all, these are people who share their 
values, grew up in the same neighborhoods, and occupy the same 
socioeconomic strata.  When they honestly pursue policy in 
accordance with their own convictions, they will be serving the 
interests of those who helped elect them. 
The relationship between former President George W. Bush and 
large oil companies provides an easy example of the distinction 
between focusing on the impact of money on politicians versus 
elections.  What is the proper relationship between the following 
three facts? A) Individuals associated with the oil and gas industry 
contributed more than $2 million to then-Governor Bush’s 2000 
presidential election campaign, and only $145,000 to his opponent Al 
Gore;235 B) President Bush won the primary and the general elections; 
and C) As president, Mr. Bush moved aggressively to attempt to drill 
for oil in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.236 
 
but most are inconclusive due to difficulties in separating correlation and causation.  
Sure, candidates who receive large contributions from special interests tend to vote 
their way; but did they vote that way because they received the contribution, or did 
they receive the contribution because they were likely to vote that way?  In his Yale 
speech, Senator Chis Murphy noted “[t]here really are very few quid pro quos.”  
Chris Murphy, supra note 90. 
 234  See supra Part III.C 
 235  CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries
/recips.php?ind=E01&cycle=2000&recipdetail=P&mem=N&sortorder=U (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2013). 
 236  Justin Blum, 51-49 Senate Vote Backs Arctic Oil Drilling: Longtime Bush Goal for 
Alaskan Wildlife Refuge Closer to Reality, WASH. POST (March 17, 2005), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A40670-2005Mar16.html 
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Some would say that the oil industry “bought off” President 
Bush, inducing him to push their priorities with large campaign 
contributions.  It’s likely, however, that most observers would see this 
explanation as misunderstanding the causal relationship.  President 
Bush has a background in the oil industry and probably wanted to 
drill in the Arctic before he received a dime of oil money.  The more 
likely impact of industry-associated contributions was to help him get 
elected.  This put him in a position of power, enabling him to pursue 
the pro-oil agenda he genuinely favored prior to election.  Bolstering 
this explanation is the noticeable spike in contributions by companies 
or individuals associated with the oil and gas industry in 2000.  The 
$34 million the industry put into the federal political process in 2000 
was 57% more than its giving in 1998, 38% more than it gave the next 
cycle, and 34% more than affiliated contributors put into the next 
presidential cycle in 2004.237  It appears that the industry saw an 
opportunity to help put one of its own in the White House and 
stepped up its contributions accordingly.238 
The increasing phenomenon of wealthy, self-financing 
candidates provides another illustration of how the concept of 
corruption fails to capture our true concerns about the role of money 
in politics.  Self-financed candidates often run on the notion that 
they are impossible to “corrupt” and not “beholden” to special 
interests or other donors.  While this is likely true, many Americans 
nonetheless feel uneasy about the tens of millions of dollars spent by 
former U.S. Senator Jon Corzine or current New York City Mayor 
Michael Bloomberg to win their respective seats.  These expenditures 
may not be corrupting, yet they are still profoundly undemocratic, 
sending the message to ordinary Americans that public offices are on 
the auction block and non-wealthy citizens need not apply. 
Finally, the distinction we make between campaign 
contributions on the one hand and personal gifts on the other 
illustrates that values beyond corruption are at play.  According to 
House and Senate rules, members of Congress are generally 
prohibited from accepting any gift valued at or above $50.239  Do we 
 
 237  Oil & Gas, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org
/industries/indus.asp?Ind=E01  (last visited Sept. 10, 2013). 
 238  Since George Bush and Al Gore both accepted public funds for the 2000 
general election, oil and gas interests were not permitted to give more money 
directly to Bush.  They could, however, help Bush’s chances by giving more money to 
Republicans generally.  In 2000, 78% of oil and gas affiliated contributions went to 
Republicans.  See supra note 70. 
 239  Gift Rules for Congress, PUBLIC CITIZEN July 25, 2011, 
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really believe that a $51 gift is more corrupting than a $10,400 
campaign contribution from a married couple over an election 
cycle?240  Or, is it more likely that we set the gift threshold so 
comparably low because we do not want wealthy individuals or 
interests to have an advantage over regular citizens who cannot afford 
to take a member of Congress out to a fancy meal or to a sporting 
event in order to gain access to her valuable time?  The low gift 
threshold seems to be motivated more by a desire for equality—for 
keeping Americans on the same footing with respect to their access to 
their representatives—than by the concern that $60 meals or $75 
gold paper weights will cause a member of Congress to change her 
vote. 
5.  Wrong Problem, False Solutions 
The main point is that, even if we are able to eliminate all 
financial quid pro quo “corruption” from the electoral process, 
money would still exercise tremendous influence on elections and 
hence policy outcomes.  Further, mis-defining the problem as being 
exclusively about this narrow concern hinders our ability to 
ameliorate the deeper pernicious impact of large contributions on 
our democracy.241  Articulating the wrong problem can lead to false 
solutions.  The best example of a false campaign finance solution on 
point here is the ingenious but flawed concept of anonymous 
contributions, or the “secret donation booth.”242  This idea quite 
cleverly addresses the problem of money corrupting politicians 
(because a candidate would not know who has contributed to her 
campaign), but does nothing to prevent wealthy donors from 
exerting disproportionate influence over which candidates are able 
to mount successful campaigns (unless accompanied by strict 
contribution limits). 
The above discussion details the limitations of basing campaign 
 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/Gift-Rules-for-Congress.pdf. 
 240  The current contribution limit to candidate committees is $2,600 per person 
per election.  Contribution Limits for 2013-2014, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 
http://www.fec.gov/info/contriblimitschart1314.pdf. 
 241  See Landell v. Sorrell, 406 F. 3d 159, 163–64 (2d Cir. 2005), reh’g en banc denied, 
382 F.3d 91 (“Efforts to tailor all campaign finance reform to corruption—the one 
state interest heretofore recognized by the Supreme Court as sufficiently compelling 
to justify spending restrictions of any sort—surely have constrained possibilities for 
creative proposals that may not fit comfortably into the proffered box.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 242  BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE 6 (2002). 
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finance jurisprudence entirely (or even mostly) on the corruption 
rationale.  In the past few years, the Roberts Court has taken these 
limitations to their (somewhat) logical extreme.  In 2006, the Court 
struck Vermont’s $200 contribution limits, which clearly served to 
democratize the role of money but which were difficult to defend as 
solely an anti-corruption measure.243  Citizens United, decided in 2010, 
permitted corporate independent expenditures and opened the door 
to Super PACs because the Court determined that so-called 
independent spending presents no risk of corruption as a matter of 
law.244  In 2011, the Court struck Arizona’s trigger matching system 
intended to enable publicly financed candidates to respond to 
onslaughts of spending by big money opponents or outside groups, 
specifically holding that the matching funds were unconstitutional 
because they were intended to level the playing field and not to fight 
corruption.245 
6.  A Way Out of the Wilderness 
Prior to Citizens United, some reformers believed that we could 
justify most, if not all, necessary reform measures under a broadly-
conceived anti-corruption rationale—even if much of the public 
support behind such policies was based upon a desire to level the 
playing field and prevent large donors from drowning out the voices 
of non-wealthy citizens.  This is plainly no longer the case.246  As noted 
above, the corruption interest was always inadequate, and the Roberts 
Court has made it almost completely unavailing. 
And, matters could soon get worse.  In February 2013, the Court 
announced that it will entertain an attack on limits on the total 
amount of money that any individual can contribute to all federal 
candidates, parties, and PACs.247  This could lead to more than $1 
billion in additional direct campaign contributions from a small 
number of elite donors through the 2020 election cycle, increasing 
their power at the expense of small donors and ordinary citizens.248  
 
 243  Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006). 
 244  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010). 
 245  Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2825–
26 (2011). 
 246  In making this assertion, I am not including some of the newer corruption-
based rationales that have been proffered in recent years, and which I cite to below.  
See infra note 251. 
 247  McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 893 F. Supp. 2d 133, 135 (D.D.C. 
2012), prob. juris. noted, 133 S. Ct. 1242 (2013). 
 248  Adam Lioz & Blair Bowie, McCutcheon Money: The Projected Impact of Striking 
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These “aggregate contribution limits” can be defended under the 
corruption regime as prophylactic measures to prevent large-dollar 
solicitations by officeholders and party officials that raise the threat of 
quid pro quo corruption and avoid circumvention of other limits on 
direct contributions.  But, they could also be defended (and perhaps 
more compellingly) as basic limitations on the disproportionate 
influence of a few wealthy donors on who runs for office and who 
wins elections, had the Court not closed this door. 
The Supreme Court’s current campaign finance jurisprudence 
has placed out-of-bounds the fundamental reforms needed to enable 
ordinary citizens to claim our democracy from billionaires and 
special interests—and limiting the government’s interest to fighting 
corruption (as narrowly understood as possible) has been the anti-
regulatory justices’ primary tool. 
While important work remains to defend the few remaining 
effective campaign finance laws on the books, now is the time to turn 
our attention to achieving the type of transformative change in the 
legal-constitutional landscape that will enable policy advocates to 
once again go on the offensive to start building a democracy in which 
the strength of a citizen’s voice no longer depends upon the size of 
her wallet.  In short, we must clarify that the founders never intended 
the First Amendment to be a tool for use by wealthy donors to 
dominate our political discourse by crowding out the rest of America.  
Moreover, there is room under the First Amendment to regulate 
money in politics to promote political equality or other important 
values that help us achieve a truly representative government. 
This will not be a straightforward path, and many unanswered 
questions pave the road ahead.  The biggest question is how to get 
from here to there.  After all, I am proposing that the Supreme Court 
recognize either an interest it has flatly rejected as recently as 2011249 
and as completely as in the Court’s seminal campaign finance case,250 
or an untested alternative. 
Over the past several years, scholars have proposed various 
theoretical pathways out of the current jurisprudential box.  Some of 
these build out from the concept of corruption.251  Other theories 
 
Aggregate Contribution Limits, DEMOS & U.S. PIRG (Oct. 2013). 
 249  See Arizona Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2806.  
 250  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 251  See, e.g., Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341 
(2009) (proposing a wholesale reimagining of the idea of corruption, moving away 
from the narrow quid pro quo conception of the Citizens United Court and towards an 
institutional view that she grounds in the founders’ conception of a working 
LIOZ (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2013  2:20 PM 
2013] BREAKING THE VICIOUS CYCLE 1279 
 
speak to the effective workings of democracy itself.252  And, some 
propose additional compelling government interests in regulating 
money that the Supreme Court has not considered or accepted, such 
as maximizing citizen participation253 or protecting candidates’ and 
elected officials’ time from the constant demands of fundraising so 
that they may focus adequately on the tasks of governance.254 
And, of course, there is the equality interest itself.  Just because 
the Court has rejected a specific interest in the past does not mean it 
cannot change paths.  The compelling new social science research 
described above provides an important reason for the Court to 
reconsider its antipathy towards political equality in the domain of 
political speech.  And the new justices that ascend to the bench in the 
coming years may well bring different views and life experiences 
 
democracy); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—
AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (2011) (articulating the concept of “dependence corruption,” 
which results when candidates for elected office, and thereby elected officials, exhibit 
a dependence upon a separate class of funders rather than on “the People” alone).  
Rick Hasen has argued that dependence corruption is simply a slightly different 
articulation of what is ultimately a political equality argument.  See Rick Hasen, Is 
“Dependence Corruption” Distinct from a Political Equality Argument for Campaign Finance 
Reform? A Reply to Professor Lessig, 12 ELECTION L.J. (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2220851.  Robert Post, on the 
other hand, sees the argument as substantively different in that it is grounded in a 
particular conception of representation.  See Robert Post, Representative Democracy: The 
Constitutional Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 179. 
 252  See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Madison Lecture: Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 245, 252–53 (2002) (noting the importance of “the Constitution’s general 
participatory self-government objective” and affirming that “[t]he First Amendment’s 
constitutional role is not simply one of protecting the individual’s ‘negative’ freedom 
from governmental restraint.  The Amendment in context also forms a necessary 
part of a constitutional system designed to sustain that democratic self-
government.”); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401 (2000) (Breyer  J., 
concurring) (“[B]y limiting the size of the largest contributions, [campaign finance] 
restrictions aim to democratize the influence that money itself may bring to bear on 
the electoral process. . . .  In doing so, they seek to build public confidence in that 
process and broaden the base of a candidate’s meaningful financial support, 
encouraging the public participation and open discussion that the First Amendment 
itself presupposes.”).  See also Representative Democracy: The Constitutional Theory of 
Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 179 (developing a theory of “discursive 
democracy” which would sanction regulations that foster “electoral integrity” and 
hence democratic legitimacy by causing citizens to believe subjectively that their 
representatives are responsive to public opinion). 
 253  See generally Spencer Overton, The Participation Interest, 100 GEO. L.J. 1259 
(2012). 
 254  See generally Mark C. Alexander, Let Them Do Their Jobs: The Compelling 
Government Interest in Protecting the Time of Candidates and Elected Officials, 37 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 669 (2006). 
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along with them.255 
This potential transformation of the jurisprudence that governs 
the role of money in politics will not take place in a vacuum.  As 
noted above, the People have noticed the predicament the Court has 
put us in—and they are not sitting on their hands.  There is a 
burgeoning movement to amend the U.S. Constitution to directly fix 
what the Court has mangled over forty years.  As of this writing, 
sixteen states and more than five hundred municipalities have passed 
resolutions calling on Congress to propose a constitutional 
amendment to overturn Citizens United, Buckley, and/or the doctrine 
of corporate constitutional rights more generally.256 
My own views on the various constitutional rationales described 
above are the subject for another day.  Suffice it to say, for now, there 
is plenty of work ahead for scholars, lawyers, judges, and concerned 
citizens who stand ready to, finally, construct a democratic republic 
that lives up to its professed ideals. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Let us return to where we started, and answer the questions 
posed at the start of this Article.  Why has debate in Washington 
centered on cutting deficits when most Americans consider creating 
jobs a higher priority?  Why did Congress enact severe across-the-
board budget cuts that fall heavily on the backs of the neediest 
citizens, and then move swiftly to exempt relatively well-off airline 
travelers from the impact of these cuts?  Because the wealthy 
prioritize cutting deficits over creating jobs; and because the U.S. 
government responds differentially (and often exclusively) to the 
preferences of the wealthy.  And, this is in large part because the U.S. 
 
 255  The average age of the five eldest justices is seventy five, and three of these five 
(Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) are conservatives who do not support an 
equality-based campaign finance jurisprudence.  So, a shift in the Court’s perspective 
could be driven by impending retirements and the ideology of justices appointed by 
presidents motivated to secure their own constitutional views across time.  But, it 
could also be driven to some degree by the generational impact of the Inequality 
Era.  The elder justices entered adulthood in the 1950s and 1960s—just before 
America’s income and wealth gap became an ever-widening chasm.  HACKER & 
PIERSON, supra note 43 (citing the 1970s as a breaking point in economic inequality 
in America).  Critically, some of the justices that will ascend to the bench in the next 
decade may have come of age or entered economic life as that chasm was expanding, 
and therefore have a different take on the proper relationship between capitalism 
and democracy.  Perhaps it is no coincidence that Buckley was decided in 1976. 
 256  Local and State Resolutions, UNITED FOR THE PEOPLE, 
http://www.united4thepeople.org/local.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2013). 
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Supreme Court, through a simplistic and impoverished First 
Amendment jurisprudence, has shaped a democracy in which the 
strength of a citizen’s voice depends upon the size of her wallet. 
Breaking this vicious cycle—in which the wealthy minority 
control political outcomes, only to write economic rules that further 
concentrate prosperity in the hands of the few, who can then exert an 
even tighter grip on the political process—is the defining legal battle 
of our generation.  The fight for racial equity was the cornerstone 
legal struggle of the prior generation.  After legal advocacy, 
grassroots organizing, and blood in the streets, we have eliminated 
formal race discrimination and made substantial (although decidedly 
incomplete) progress against de facto discrimination.257  In addition, 
the current generation has embraced equality with respect to sexual 
orientation as a natural successor to racial equality claims.258  There 
have been a number of victories in state courts, legislatures, and 
ballot initiatives, and the last Supreme Court term brought important 
progress on this front as well.259  Given the stark generational 
differences on this issue, victories for full equality have taken on an 
air of inevitability. 
These critical fights are about safeguarding existing protections 
and consolidating victories.  This generation’s defining battle must be 
a drive for forward progress, going from zero to sixty, likely over 
several decades.  The United States is fast becoming defined by 
unprecedented political and economic inequality, and we now stand 
at a crossroads.  In the wake of Citizens United, we will either pick 
ourselves up and fight our way towards a truly representative 
 
 257  Make no mistake, our generation must carry forward the torch of racial equity.  
The 2012 elections saw a spate of mostly partisan-motivated, but highly racially-
consequential efforts to deny Americans their fundamental right and freedom to 
vote.  See, e.g., Wendy R. Weiser & Diana Kasdan, Voting Law Changes: Election Update, 
THE BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (2012), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/Voting_Law
_Changes_Election_Update.pdf.  In spite of these current challenges, and the fact 
that both the Department of Justice and the D.C. District Court have used the 
Section 5 “pre-clearance” procedures in the Voting Rights Act to block racially 
discriminatory voting changes in the past year, the Supreme Court recently struck 
the Act’s coverage formula.  Shelby County v. Holder, supra note 151.   
 258  Perhaps the clearest indication that this represents a generational sea change 
is that the nation’s leading coalition of civil rights organization recently changed its 
name from the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights to the Leadership Conference 
on Civil and Human Rights, a move clearly intended to accommodate the Human 
Rights Campaign and other leading LGBT rights groups. 
 259  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 
S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
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democracy, or we will continue our recent slide towards plutocracy.  
We will take decisive action to break and reverse the vicious cycle of 
economic and political domination by the wealthy minority, or we 
will allow the cycle to spin out of control—possibly until it builds too 
much momentum to stop peacefully. 
To choose representative democracy, we must rescue our 
Constitution.  This is the task to which the great legal minds of our 
day must apply themselves.  No less than the fate of the Republic is at 
stake. 
 
